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Contemporary computer software strives to maintain a balance
between the functional aspects embodied in a program's underlying
algorithms and the user's end experience when operating that pro-
gram. In today's highly competitive software market, a commercially
viable program must not only possess a strong algorithmic engine, it
must also be "user friendly." Consequently, the "look and feel" of a
program is critical to the program's success, since efficient and power-
ful algorithms which possess unwieldy user interfaces are of limited
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commercial value. "Look and feel" describes what the end-user ulti-
mately experiences when manipulating the program. It may entail,
among other elements, unique screen displays, the structure and
menu hierarchy of the application, or creative user interfaces for
manipulating data and program flow.
The last five years have witnessed an explosion in intuitive and
graphical interfaces.' Moreover, as computers have become more
powerful,2 the calculations necessary to maintain robust graphical en-
vironments have become more affordable and practical. 3 This rapid
increase in "mainstream technology" has allowed graphical user inter-
faces (GUIs) to penetrate the software market quickly. Furthermore,
since commercial viability and profit generation are integrally linked
to a program's interface, courts must strive to determine what sorts of
protection to offer software publishers as an incentive to develop crea-
tive interfaces, while simultaneously encouraging healthy competition.
Whether one may invoke the Copyright Act4 to protect the non-
literal aspects of computer software is far from settled law.5 Litigants
asserting that copyright law protects the "look and feel" of software
have obtained mixed legal results.6 Although copyright claims will
continue to be a major device employed to protect the "look and feel"
of software, several jurisdictions disfavor this method of protection.
I The market penetration of Microsoft Windows, Windows NT, and similar applica-
tions in business and home environments evidences consumer thirst for expressive and
easy to use interfaces.
2 The latest Intel processing chip, the Pentium, possesses approximately twice the
processing power of the previous generation. The practical upshot is that graphical inter-
faces that were computationally infeasible five years ago are now, or at least will shortly
become, quite manageable and affordable on virtually all home computers.
3 Interfaces that are primarily graphical, such as the Microsoft Windows environment
and Apple's system 7.0, are known as GUIs (pronounced "gooeys"), or graphical user inter-
faces. A GUI is defined as "a design for the part of the program that interacts with the user
and takes full advantage of the bit-mapped graphics displays of personal computers."
BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER, QUE'S COMPUTER USER'S DICFIONARY 241 (2d ed. 1991). A GUI usu-
ally employs pull-down menus and requires on-screen graphics in the display of icons
(graphical representations of algorithmic activities and computer functions) as well as in
the display of typefaces. In short, a GUI is the total combination of graphical and visual
components of a program as manipulated through menus and icons via an input device
(typically a mouse or keyboard).
4 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended at 17
U.S.C. §§ 101-1010 (1988)).
5 For a recent analysis of the state of copyright protection as applied to the "look and
feel" of software, see Jack Ruzzo &Jamie Nafziger, Software "Look And Feel" Protection in the
1990s, 15 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. LJ. 571 (1993); John Hornick, Computer Program Copy-
rights: Look and Feel No Evil 5 SoFTWARE L.J. 355 (1992).
6 See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990)
(holding that a program's menu hierarchy, alternatively referred to as the menu tree, is
protected by federal copyright law); ef. Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204 (9th
Cir. 1988) (holding that "look and feel" of competing video games was not substantially
similar for copyright infringement purposes).
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Accordingly, an alternative protective method warrants considera-
tion-namely, a cause of action under the rubric of trade dress.7
Compared with copyright law, trade dress is a superior mecha-
nism for the protection of GUIs for three separate reasons. First, a
successful trade dress claim requires legal and factual elements dis-
tinct from those required of copyright claims-elements better suited
for the protection of software. Second, the legal history and animat-
ing forces defining trade dress and copyright law differ in substantial
and not unimportant ways. Finally, a recent United States Supreme
Court decision, Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc.," provides the crea-
tive computer lawyer with the conceptual tools necessary to argue that
trade dress protection applies to the non-literal aspects of computer
software, and in particular, to a program's "look and feel." In Two
Pesos the Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the circuits regard-
ing the application of section 43 (a) of the Lanham Trademark Protec-
tion Act.9 Specifically, the Court developed a new standard with
respect to the common-law doctrine of trade dress that proves particu-
larly interesting to computer lawyers.
The constructive thesis of this Note is divided into four Parts.
Part I offers a brief introduction to trademark law and outlines the
legislative history of the Lanham Act. Part II outlines the basic ele-
ments of a trade dress claim: secondary meaning, inherently distinct
features, likelihood of consumer confusion, and the affirmative de-
fense of functionality. Part II also applies these basic elements to
7 The financial stakes at risk are quite large. In recent years, the information tech-
nology industry has grown to represent approximately five percent of gross national prod-
uct, with sales of over $234 billion in 1991 alone. Victoria Slind-Flor, 'Trade Dress' Seen to
Protect Trademarks: Computer Software Producers Seek Additional Safeguards, NAT'L LJ., May 17,
1993, at 1.
8 112 S. Ct. 2753, reh'g denied, 113 S. Ct. 20 (1992).
9 Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §1125(a), provides:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any
container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact, which-
(1) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(2) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the na-
ture, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or an-
other person's goods, services, or commercial activities,
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is
or is likely to be damaged by such act.
Note, however, that because Taco Cabana initially brought suit in 1987, the Supreme
Court rendered its decision under a now superseded version of § 43(a). See Two Pesos, 112
S. Ct. at 2756 n.2; infra part III. The amendment does not substantively alter the analysis or




graphical user interfaces. Part III presents the Supreme Court's Two
Pesos decision and discusses that decision's implications for intellec-
tual property lawyers. Finally, Part IV provides closing comments on
asserting trade dress protection for GUIs, and includes a model appli-
cation based loosely upon the litigation between Apple, Inc. and
Microsoft, Inc. Ultimately, this Note argues that GUIs-as well as fu-
ture creative interfaces-deserve protection under trade dress doc-
trine provided that the protected elements (i) are distinctive in
nature, either inherently so or as acquired through secondary mean-
ing, (ii) are dejure nonfunctional, and (iii) would create a substantial
likelihood of consumer confusion if duplicated by a competitor.
I
TRADEMARK LAW, THE LAN-LAkM AcT AND ITS LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
A. A Brief Introduction to Trademark Law
Trademark law traverses a wide and varied course. It protects not
only words and trade phrases, but drawings, logos, and distinctive fea-
tures of a product's packaging. For example, a manufacturer of a soft-
drink will generally have trademark interests in the name of the
product, the artwork on the bottle, the advertising slogan used to pro-
mote the product, and the shape of the bottle, if that shape is distinc-
tive. If a competing softdrink producer markets a drink with a
substantially similar name ("Koke" in competition with "Coke," for in-
stance), then the initial trademark owner may obtain a court order
requiring the second producer to cease the infringement. Addition-
ally, the mark owner may seek recovery for any damages caused by the
unfair competition and tarnishment of its reputation. Trademarks,
therefore, are socially and economically important tools because they
permit consumers to identify the source of a product's origin, and,
depending upon their experience with this manufacturer, to seek out
or avoid buying these goods again.
"Trade dress," a subset of general trademark law, denotes the
form in which a producer presents its product to the market. Trade
dress involves a product's total image and may include features such
as size, shape, color or color combinations, texture, or graphics. 10 As
stated by the Seventh Circuit, "a label, a package, even the cover of a
book might be trade dress."'" The Eleventh Circuit concluded, for
example, that the "adoption procedure" and paperwork employed in
the sale of "The Little People" toy dolls qualified as protectible trade
10 See Stormy Clime Ltd. v. Progroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 974 (2d Cir. 1987);John H.
Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983).
11 Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986).
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dress.12 Furthermore, although trade dress traditionally refers to the
packaging or labeling of a product, most circuits recognize that the
overall design of a product may function as trade dress, thereby enti-
tling the manufacturer to protection under the Lanham Act.'3
Trade dress protection stems from section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.14 Section 43(a) is not limited to trademark and trade dress in-
fringement, but rather addresses all forms of unfair competition. Be-
cause both trade dress and trademark protection find their origin in
the same common-law torts, 15 and because the Lanham Act concerns
unfair competition generally, few legally substantive distinctions exist
between the law of trademark and the law of trade dress.16 Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Lanham Act neither
requires nor supports divergent treatment of trademarks and trade
dress.17
Because of its roots in the tort of "passing off,"' 8 trade dress is
ultimately concerned with consumer confusion and therefore focuses
upon the total appearance and image of a product as it is recognized
by buyers in the relevant market. Thus, an inquiry into protectable
trade dress does not look to individual elements, which of themselves
may lack substantial significance, 19 but rather focuses on the totality of
effect that the product's functional and non-functional features cre-
ate.20 The trade dress of a product, therefore, "is essentially its total
image and overall appearance."2 1 In Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R.
12 Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831 (11th Cir.
1982).
13 See, e.g., Stormy Clime, 809 F.2d at 971; Warner Bros. Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d
76 (2d Cir. 1981); Harlequin Enters. Ltd. v. Gulf & Western Corp., 644 F.2d 946, 949 (2d
Cir. 1981). See also supra notes 10-12; infra note 23.
14 See supra note 9 for the text of § 43(a).
15 In part I.B this Note reviews the common-law foundation of trademark law and
examines the legislative history of the Lanham Act.
16 See, e.g., Blau Plumbing, Inc. v. S.O.S. Fix-It, Inc., 781 F.2d 604, 608 (7th Cir. 1986).
17 The Supreme Court stated in Two Pesos.
[T]he protection of trademarks and trade dress under § 43(a) serves the
same statutory purpose of preventing deception and unfair competition.
There is no persuasive reason to apply different analysis to the two....
It would be a different matter if there were textual basis in § 43(a) for
treating inherently distinctive verbal or symbolic trademarks differently
from inherently distinctive trade dress. But there is none.
Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2760.
18 See infra part I.B for a more detailed explanation of the common-law foundation of
trade dress.
19 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1042 (2d
Cir. 1992) ("Individual aspects of a trade dress may be eligible for trademark protection in
their own right, but in an action for trade dress infringement each aspect should be viewed
in relation to the entire trade dress.").
20 See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987)
("[F]unctional elements that are separately unprotectable can be protected together as
part of a trade dress." (citation omitted)).
21 Blue Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1989).
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Others, Inc., the Ninth Circuit articulated the test for trade dress in-
fringement as whether "there is a likelihood of confusion resulting
from the total effect of the defendant's package on the eye and mind
of the ordinary purchaser."22
In accordance with this emphasis on totality of effect, courts have
found protectable trade dress in a variety of situations. For example,
courts have held that a product's overall design,23 its packaging or
casing,24 a china pattern,25 a television commercial's theme,26 the to-
tal "look and feel" of a restaurant's interior,27 and even a rock group's
musical performance style28 each constitute protectable trade dress.
Thus, since trade dress concerns itself with the overall, or gestalt, im-
pression created by a product, both software interfaces and the "look
and feel" of an application readily fall within the ambit of the Lanham
Act as interpreted through the common-law tradition. 29
In the typical case in which a manufacturer seeks to prevent
others from copying the appearance, or trade dress, of its product,
protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act involves a two
phase inquiry. Phase one consists of the plaintiff's factual proof while
phase two provides the defendant an opportunity to raise a potent
affirmative defense. In the first phase, the plaintiff must prove both
(i) that the trade dress has either acquired secondary meaning or is
inherently distinctive, and (ii) that the design of the competitor's
product is confusingly similar to that of the plaintiff's product.30
Trade dress acquires secondary meaning when the primary purpose of
the dress is to identify the product's source of origin.3' Alternatively,
22 826 F.2d at 841 (quoting Fabrica, Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890, 894 (9th
Cir. 1983)).
23 See, e.g., LA. Gear, Inc. v. Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1129 (Fed. Cir.)
("Trade dress protection is not limited to the exterior packaging of a product, for 'the
design of a product itself may function as its packaging, serving to distinguish it from other
products, and hence be protectable trade dress under § 43(a)'" (quoting Wallace Interna-
tional Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., 916 F.2d 76, 78-79 (2d Cir. 1990))), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993); Veryfine Prods., Inc. v. Colon Bros., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 240 (D.
P.R. 1992).
24 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1033 (2d
Cir. 1992) (applying trade dress to the colored casing of a prescription drug).
25 See, eg., Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke K.G. v. THC Systems, Inc., 999 F.2d
619 (2d Cir. 1993).
26 See Chuck Blore & Don Richman Inc. v. 20/20 Advertising, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 671,
680-82 (D. Minn. 1987) (ruling that an issue of material fact existed that could give rise to
a finding of protectable trade dress).
27 See, e.g., Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. 2753; Fuddnickers, 826 F.2d 837.
28 Cesare v. Work, 520 N.E.2d 586, 593 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) ("The trade dress of the
band Revolver was the performance .... The ensemble of the instruments, the stage set-
ting, outfits, song list, delivery, character interpretation, and choreography of the audience
participation ...
29 See infra part Il.
30 See infra part II.C for a detailed discussion of confusing similarity.
31 See infra part IIA for a detailed discussion of secondary meaning.
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trade dress is inherently distinctive if it is either fanciful or arbitrary in
design.3 2 In the second phase, even if the initial manufacturer suc-
ceeds in both of the prior factual showings, the competitor may never-
theless prevail if it can prove that the copied elements were
functionally dictated. This affirmative defense is based upon the intel-
lectual property doctrine of "merger through functionality."33
B. The History of the Lanham Act
The Lanham Act's purpose is to promote public identification
and distinguishability among competing goods to the benefit of both
consumers and producers.3 4 Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act3 5 does
not concern the registration or maintenance of trademarks per se.
Instead, section 43(a) is rooted in the common-law tort of passing off
or palming off, which derives from the torts of fraud and deceit.3 6
"Palming off" or "passing off' is an attempt by a manufacturer to
deceive the public into believing that it is trading or dealing with one
company when in fact it is dealing with another.3 7 Drawing on this
common-law tradition, section 43 (a) protects unregistered trademarks
and explicitly proscribes both "false designation of origin" and "false
or misleading description" of goods. 38
32 See infra part II.B for a detailed discussion of inherent distinctiveness.
33 Merger through functionality provides that the elements sought to be protected
merge into unprotectable form when they are functionally mandated. This doctrine
presents the greatest obstacle in the application of trade dress protection to GUIs. See infra
part II.D for a full treatment of merger through functionality.
34 S. REi. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1946), reprinted in 79 U.S. CODE CONG.
SERVICE 1274-75. A primary purpose of the Lanham Act articulated in both the House and
Senate reports was to "make possible a choice between competing articles by enabling the
buyer to distinguish one from the other." Id. at 1274. Furthermore, the Lanham Act has
as its object "the protection of trade-marks, securing to the owner the good will of his
business and protecting the public against spurious and falsely marked goods." Id.; see also
Franchised Stores, Inc. v. Winter, 394 F.2d 664, 668 (2d Cir. 1968) (citing 79 U.S. CODE
CONG. SERVICE 1274).
35 Codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1992). See supra note 8.
36 As the Second Circuit concluded in Franchised Stores, 394 F.2d at 668, "the evil
sought to be remedied in the trademark infringement action is that of 'passing off-the
'sale of another's goods as those of the trade-mark owner by use of the owner's mark.' "
(citation omitted). For historical treatment of the tort of passing or palming off, see J.
THOMAS MCCARThY, TRADEMARS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 5.2, at 133-35 (2d ed. 1984 &
Supp. 1991).
37 See, e.g., Kazmaier v. Wooten, 761 F.2d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 1985) (" 'Palming off' is
defined as 'an attempt by one person to induce customers to believe that his products are
actually those of another.' ") (quoting Remco Indus. v. Toyomenka, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 948,
954 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 397 F.2d 977 (2d Cir. 1968)); Laser Indus. Ltd. v. Eder Instrument
Co., Inc., 573 F. Supp. 987, 991-992 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("Passing off or palming off refers to
the conduct of selling goods as the goods of another or doing business as the business of
another such that the public is misled by the conduct and believes it is purchasing the
goods of another or doing business with someone other than the actual seller.");
Datacomm Interface, Inc. v. Computerworld, Inc., 489 N.E.2d 185 (Mass. 1986).
38 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); see supra note 9 for text.
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In contrast, the Copyright Act of 1976 does not share this com-
mon-law tort tradition. Copyright is a positive right created by federal
statute and finds its justificatory source in the Constitution.3 9 Federal
copyright is thus purely statutory in origin, and federal copyright com-
mon-law rights are nonexistent.40 Copyright, like trademark law, cre-
ates an artificial monopoly, but a copyright, unlike a trademark, does
not identify the source of goods.
This difference in the origin of trademark and copyright law is
significant. The common-law foundation of trade dress supports
broad protection for software interfaces, including screen displays,41
that courts may be hesitant to award under copyright law. In short,
interfaces that are both highly stylized and individualized to specific
publishers tend to indicate a program's source of origin, and accord-
ingly deserve trademark protection as defined by the common-law tra-
dition that animates the Lanham Act.
Judicial interpretation of the Lanham Act began in a cautious
manner. Initially, the Act's proscription of "false designation of ori-
gin" was limited to cases involving false designations of geographic
origin.42 Likewise, courts limited "false description" of goods to those
cases involving materially false advertising-representations that
goods or services possessed characteristics that they did not actually
have. 43
Contemporary courts, however, recognize that the primary pur-
pose of the Lanham Act is to protect both the consumer and the pro-
ducer in identifying the source of a product. Thus, these courts have
expanded the scope of the Act and no longer focus on the alleged
infringer's intent to deceive, as the tort of palming off required. To-
day, confusion is the litmus test.44 "Although some have criticized the
39 The Constitution empowers Congress "to promote the Progress of Science and use-
ful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
40 In other words, the Copyright Act alone determines what rights and remedies au-
thors possess. Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that substantive
alternations to these rights and remedies must come from Congressional action and not
judicial activism. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417 (1984); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Caliga v. Inter Ocean Newspaper Co., 215
U.S. 182 (1909).
41 Some decisions indicate that the individual screen displays of a program may be
copyrighted as audio-visual works, although the law is far from settled. See, e.g., Digital
Comm. Assoc., Inc. v. Softklone Dist. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987); Broderbund
Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
42 See, e.g., Scotch Whiskey Assoc. v. Barton Distilling Co., 338 F. Supp. 595, 598-99
(N.D. Ill. 1971) (holding that use of the phrase "House of Stuart Blended Scotch Whiskey"
constituted false designation of origin where the spirit was not produced in Scotland).
43 See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2762 (StevensJ., concurring).
44 See, e.g., Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2763 (StevensJ., concurring) ("[T]he test for liabil-
ity is likelihood of confusion: '[U]nder the Lanham Act [§ 43(a)], the ultimate test is
whether the public is likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity of the marks....
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expansion as unwise, it is now 'a firmly embedded reality.' "45 As the
United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission
noted:
Section 43(a) is an enigma, but a very popular one. Narrowly drawn
and intended to reach false designations or representations as to
the geographical origin of products, the section has been widely in-
terpreted to create, in essence, a federal law of unfair competi-
tion.... It has definitely eliminated a gap in unfair competition
law, and its vitality is showing no signs of age. 46
Moreover, Congress impliedly supported this expansive interpre-
tation of the Act when it enacted the 1988 amendment.47 Even when
expansively read, however, it is not clear from the language of the Act
or its 1988 amendment whether Congress intended to require proof
of secondary meaning as a prerequisite for protection of trade dress-
an issue the Supreme Court only recently resolved in Two Pesos. Addi-
tionally, because section 43(a) does not employ the phrases "trade
dress," "trademark," or "secondary meaning," the interpretative issue
is severely occluded. In other words, where trade dress is concerned,
the Lanham Act's language is helpful, but neither dispositive nor con-
clusive. One must look to the Act's purpose and legislative history to
divine its intended scope. Therefore, comprehending the Act's teleo-
logical basis is a crucial step in the successful application of section
43(a).
Whether we call the violation infringement, unfair competition or false designation of ori-
gin, the test is identical-is there a 'likelihood of confusion?'" (quoting New West Corp. v.
NYM Co., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th Cir. 1979))).
45 Id. (footnotes omitted).
46 The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and Recom-
mendations to USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 426 (1987)
(footnote omitted).
47 See S. REP. No. 515, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.CA.N.
5577, 5603. The report concludes that:
Section 35 revises Section 43(a) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 1125(a)) to cod-
ify the interpretation it has been given by the courts. Because Section 43(a)
of the Act fills an important gap in federal unfair competition law, the com-
mittee expects the courts to continue to interpret the section.
As written, Section 43(a) appears to deal only with false descriptions or
representations and false designations of geographic origin. Since its en-
actment in 1946, however, it has been widely interpreted as creating, in
essence, a federal law of unfair competition. For example, it has been ap-
plied to cases involving the infringement of unregistered marks, violations
of trade dress and certain nonfunctional configurations of goods and ac-




THE ELEMENTS OF A TRADE DRESS CLAIM As APPLIED TO
GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACES (GUIs)
To successfully protect the "look and feel" of software under sec-
tion 43 (a) of the Lanham Act, a computer lawyer must establish three
primary elements.48 First, the interface or display must either be in-
herently distinctive or possess secondary meaning in the relevant mar-
ket segment. Second, the infringing product must be likely to cause
consumer confusion, such that the common-law principles for passing
off or palming off are met. Finally, as in other intellectual property
disciplines, the doctrine of merger through functionality lurks in the
shadows, ready to defeat claims of protection that create a de facto
monopoly in functionally required characteristics. Therefore, a suc-
cessful plaintiff must prove that the trade dress elements seeking pro-
tection are de jure nonfunctional.
A. Secondary Meaning Defined
"The secondary meaning inquiry is the same for trade dress as it
is for a trademark."49 Simply stated, to establish secondary meaning,
"a manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the public, the pri-
mary significance of a product feature or term [or trade dress] is to
identify the source of the product rather than the product itself." 50
Further, there is some authority for the proposition that the secon-
dary meaning must attach before the putative infringement begins.51
48 The third element-that the dress is nonfunctional-is not technically part of the
plaintiff's prima facie case. Because functionality provides an insurmountable defense,
however, virtually every defendant will seek its protections, thereby requiring plaintiffs to
rebut claims of functionality. For this reason, evidence of nonfunctionality is generally
assumed to be part of the plaintiff's initial proof. See infra note Ill and accompanying
text.
49 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1042 (2d Cir.
1992).
50 Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982). See also Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938) (To establish secondary meaning the pro-
ducer "must show that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming
public is not the product but the producer."); Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Sanders Co., 328 F.2d
496, 499 (8th Cir. 1964) (" '[A] name, mark, or symbol by long and exclusive use and
advertising by one person in the sale of his goods... may become so associated in the
public mind with such goods.., that it serves to identify them and distinguish them from
the goods... of others. When such an association exists, the name, mark, or symbol is said
to have acquired a 'secondary meaning,' in which the original user has a property right
which equity will protect against unfair appropriation by a competitor.' " (quoting Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberty Ins. Co., 185 F. Supp. 895, 903 (E.D. Ark. 1960))).
51 See, e.g., Braun Inc. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 975 F.2d 815 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
("A claim of trade dress infringement fails if secondary meaning did not exist before the
infringement began."); Saratoga Vichy Spring Co., Inc. v. Lehman, 625 F.2d 1037, 1043
(2d Cir. 1980) (Priority requires a showing through preponderance of evidence that the
infringed mark possessed secondary meaning" 'at the time the defendant commenced his
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Additionally, the question of whether a dress has acquired secondary
meaning is a factual one, in which market samples and statistical data
prove efficacious.
Factors that guide the secondary meaning inquiry include: (i)
whether actual purchasers of the product associate that product's
dress with the producer, (ii) the degree and manner of advertising of
the claimed dress, (iii) the duration and manner of dress use, and (iv)
whether use of the dress has been exclusive.52 Thus, software manu-
facturers would do well to establish industry recognition of a creative
interface early in the product's lifetime, optimally before the product
reaches retail shelves. 53
Additionally, in some jurisdictions, evidence of deliberate copy-
ing is relevant to the determination of secondary meaning.54 In the
Ninth Circuit, for example, "deliberate copying may suffice to support
an inference of secondary meaning."55 Intentional copying allows
some courts to give a permissive instruction that infers secondary
meaning in the senior trade dress, although even the Ninth Circuit
has declined to hold that evidence of intentional copying necessarily
shifts the burden of proof on this issue.56 In other words, courts rea-
son that competitors have no viable reason to completely mimic an-
other's established trade dress unless the junior user were seeking to
use of the mark.' " (quoting Scott Paper Co. v. Scott's Liquid Gold, Inc., 589 F.2d 1225,
1231 (3d Cir. 1978))).
52 See, e.g., Transgo, Inc. v. Ajac Transmission Parts Corp., 768 F.2d 1001, 1015 (9th
Cir. 1985).
53 One can easily imagine a marketing blitz before the introduction of an interface or
display that associates the user-friendly "look and feel" of the forthcoming product with the
particular producer. Advertisements in computer literature stating "If you thought using
Windows was easy, watch for product X to be introducedJanuary 1. More intuitive. More
sophisticated. More enjoyable.", or something to this effect, with an accompanying screen
shot or description of the product's interface. Of course, this preemptive strategy would
not be helpful for those producers who discover an infringer only after their product has
been on the market for some time. Nevertheless, even in that scenario, advance advertis-
ing and publication in mass periodicals would be helpful prima facie proof of consumer
identification of product with producer.
54 See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 448 (4th Cir. 1986) ("We
hold that evidence of intentional, direct copying establishes a prima facie case of secondary
meaning.... "); Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 82 (3d Cir. 1982)
("copying is itself persuasive evidence of secondary meaning").
55 Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R1 Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 1987). See
also Transgo, 768 F.2d at 1016 (stating that "[p~roof of exact copying, without any opposing
proof, can be sufficient to establish a secondary meaning. 'There is no logical reason for
the precise copying save an attempt to realize upon a secondary meaning that is in exis-
tence'." (citation omitted) (quoting Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc.,
283 F.2d 551, 558 (9th Cir. 1960))).
56 See Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d at 844.
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take advantage of the senior's established good will or product
identification.57
Determination of a product's putative secondary meaning re-
quires a threshold inquiry, however, into the relevant market seg-
ment. Who must identify the senior user's product as belonging to
that manufacturer-namely, for whom must secondary meaning ob-
tain? Unfortunately, the software market presents unique difficulties
when gauging the appropriate primary market. Is the final end-user
the relevant consumer, or is it the MIS58 department who purchases
and maintains the software's integrity? One could argue that the rele-
vant market shifts depending upon the nature of the application be-
ing considered. A home check balancing program, for example,
would target the general software consuming populace. On the other
hand, a program with a strictly business orientation may find its rele-
vant market substantially narrower, consisting, for example, of MIS
departments that purchase the application, train in-house personnel,
and maintain system software integrity.59 Ultimately this is a question
for the fact-finder.
Contradictory and anomalous results could develop, however, in
this bifurcated inquiry. One interface could find protection denied
because the fact-finder determined the relevant market to be a nar-
rowly-construed business environment. Such an environment might
include professional MIS employees who are unlikely to misperceive a
product's origin and who can identify the manufacturer of an applica-
tion even where the program's "objective" secondary meaning may be
lacking.60 The same interface could then later find protection in the
home software market where greater market penetration creates an
increased likelihood of secondary meaning and its attendant
confusion.
Difficulties in defining the relevant market aside, trademark
caselaw provides a general exception to the doctrine of secondary
meaning. A line of cases permits the use of similar trade dress or
57 Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 941 (10th Cir. 1983). Of
course, where the imitated dress is functionally necessitated, then conclusions of secondary
meaning fail to obtain. See infra part II.D.
58 A MIS "Management Information Services" department is typically responsible for
software purchases and the maintenance of software within a corporate environment.
59 Certainly some business applications will still possess a relevant audience consisting
of end-users rather than MIS personnel. The main point is that determining for whom
secondary meaning must obtain is by nature an ad hoc procedure that is likely to yield
contradictory results when applied across a spectrum of cases and jurisdictions.
60 Prior to matriculation into law school, the author worked for some time in the
network support area of a MIS division. It is my experience that MIS staff members pride
themselves in their ability to identify obscure programs and their producers. On more
than one occasion I was reminded of a mutated version of the game show "Name That
Tune"-I can name that software in one screen!
1994]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
marks where two geographically remote users adopt similar marks in
good faith and without knowledge of each other's use.61 This permis-
sive use is known as the "good faith territorial use" exception.
In computer applications, however, this defense seems of little
use. Nearly all commercially viable software targets a national market.
This is especially so when one considers that many businesses possess
communication "backbones" which allow rapid data transfer and ma-
nipulation between geographically remote sites. For example, a file
server 62 which is located in California may drive the applications of a
user whose node, or terminal connection, is physically in New York
City. In this manner, most computer software falls under the ambula-
tory exception to territorial expansion.
Where the relevant consumers "are ambulatory and on the move
back and forth across the nation," then the good faith territorial use
exception to secondary meaning will not apply.63 Software consumers
are ambulatory in two distinct manners: first, through their physical
movement across the country, and second, through their "virtual"
movement across the country through computerized means. Addi-
tionally, the proliferation of personal computers and the establish-
ment of both software franchise stores and computer "superstores"
create a national audience for most applications as they are released.
It is inconceivable that a successful computer program sold on the
west coast would fail to penetrate markets throughout the rest of the
country, as may be the case with locally produced cookies, or cloth-
ing.64 Thus, trademark's common-law defense of geographically re-
mote use offers little help to a putative software infringer.
B. Inherently Distinct Defined
Software which fails to possess secondary meaning, perhaps be-
cause it is new to the marketplace or has failed to obtain substantial
market penetration, may still enjoy protection if that software is inher-
ently distinctive. Although the Supreme Court noted in Two Pesos that
61 See, e.g., United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918); Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 416 (1916).
62 A file server is a large, central, communal computer that stores information for all
users on the network. Multiple users can "access" a file server at one time, while the file
server acts as a sort of "bank" in which users deposit and withdraw data for both personal
and community use. Because communication with the file server occurs over network wir-
ing, one may access the server from any location that can receive and send telephonic
electric impulses (i.e., a phone line).
63 Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 844 (9th Cir. 1987)
(quoting J. THOMAS MCCART, TRADEMARKs AND UNFAIR COMPETrION § 26.6, at 296
(1984)).
64 Consider how many computer users employ telecommunication devices. Users log-
ging onto Compuserve or America-On-Line, for example, will find literally hundreds of
software reviews at their fingertips.
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protection accrues in inherently distinct trade dress, the Court's expli-
cation of this category is only slightly helpful. The Court appears to
employ traditional trademark categories when it analyzes the inherent
distinctiveness of trade dress. 65
Consequently, trade dress, like trademark, is classified in catego-
ries of increasing distinctiveness-namely, (i) generic, (ii) descriptive,
(iii) suggestive, (iv) arbitrary, and (v) fanciful. According to Two Pe-
sos, "[t]he latter three categories of marks, because their intrinsic na-
ture serves to identify a particular source of a product, are deemed
inherently distinctive and are entitled to protection."66 Note, how-
ever, that in some jurisdictions a finding of suggestiveness does not
imply that the dress is a strong one.67 Thus, although trade dress
which falls within the three categories determined to be inherently
distinctive (i.e., suggestive, arbitrary, and fanciful) merits protection
without a showing of secondary meaning, courts may nevertheless find
that the dress is not particularly strong and accordingly limit the
amount of protection afforded that dress.
Conversely, generic marks never obtain protection, even in light
of an established secondary meaning.68 On the other hand, descrip-
tive marks, although not inherently distinct, may acquire distinctive-
ness if they obtain an established secondary meaning in the relevant
market.69 A descriptive trade dress, to invoke an oft-cited example,
would include a lemon-shaped bottle employed to sell lemon juice,
and would require an established secondary meaning associating the
product with a particular source of origin in order to garner
protection.70
One commentator has suggested that "if the 'total image' of a
trade dress creates an unexpected visual image of the particular prod-
uct it represents, then the trade dress is inherently distinctive and pro-
tectable."7 1 Although the choice of the word "unexpected" seems
inappropriate, the point is fundamentally correct. In light of the ex-
pansive definition associated with trade dress in Two Pesos, a com-
65 See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2757. The Court favorably citesJudge Friendly's Second
Circuit decision Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976).
66 112 S. Ct. at 2757.
67 See, e.g., Lang v. Retirement Living Pub. Co., 949 F.2d 576, 581 (2d Cir. 1991) (stat-
ing that "[a] Ithough a suggestive mark is entitled to registration without evidence of secon-
dary meaning, suggestiveness is not necessarily dispositive of the issue of the strength of
the mark" (citations omitted)).
68 Id.
69 It&
70 See Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 426 (5th Cir. 1984).
71 Carl Caslowitz, Trade Dress and Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act: Protection for "Total
Image" of the Visual Displays of Software Applications, 33 IDEAJ.L. & TECH. 187 (1993).
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puter's display and interface fall potentially within the parameters of
inherent distinctiveness.
C. Likelihood of Confusion
Once an interface is shown either to be inherently distinct or to
possess secondary meaning, a Lanham Act section 43(a) cause of ac-
tion requires that there exist a likelihood of consumer confusion be-
tween the established product's trade dress and the interloping
interface. There are at least four possible types of consumer confu-
sion: (i) simple product confusion, (ii) confusion as to source of
sponsorship, (iii) subliminal trademark association, and (iv) reverse
association. 72 An explanation of these scenarios is helpful before dis-
cussing the variables weighed in the confusion calculus.
Simple product confusion occurs when purchasers of a product
believe it to be another product entirely. For example, if one con-
fuses Microsoft Word with Lotus' Ami Pro because of some interface
similarity, then simple product confusion has occurred. 73 Confusion
as to source of sponsorship, the second sort of consumer confusion, is
perhaps the most plausible scenario in the computer context. This
type of confusion takes place when the consumer mistakenly believes
that the owner of the trade dress has authored or approved the in-
fringing product. For example, if a software company develops a
unique interface that gains market popularity and a competitor copies
the design, consumers who purchase the infringing program may
wrongly conclude that the design comes from the first company. This
is particularly true in today's software market where de facto standards
substantially decrease the learning curve required of new software.
Manipulation of windows within Microsoft brand programs, for exam-
ple, is consistent across applications. A competing producer who cop-
ies this configuration may cause consumers to conclude either that
Microsoft developed this interface as well, or, at a very minimum, that
Microsoft licensed its rights in the interface to the infringing pro-
ducer. In either case, confusion as to the source of the product oc-
curs. 74 The third type of consumer confusion occurs when the
72 See, e.g., Playboy Enters. v. Chuckleberry Publishing, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 414, 428
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), affd, 687 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1982). See also infra notes 73-74 and accompa-
nying text.
73 Although this sounds improbable, consider the case where a naive computer user
reads an advertisement or a product review in industry literature. The user may find the
described interface particularly intuitive and novel and wish to acquire the software. The
user then enters a software store and examines application packages only unwittingly to
purchase the product that infringes on the original producer's trade dress.
74 This analysis is by no means limited to Microsoft brand applications. To take a
different example, Apple gathered much of its initial market share through this phenome-
non. Apple's systems' code (i.e., the base level algorithms that provide the computer with
its fundamental processes, or instruction mix) controls application "calls" from the
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infringer gains a foothold in an existing market "by exploiting sublim-
inal or conscious association with [a] protected name, mark, or trade
dress. '7 5 Finally, reverse association occurs when the consumer be-
lieves that the infringer is responsible for the original product' 6
Although courts recognize at least four distinct types of consumer
confusion, each type involves a similar test. When faced with an alle-
gation of likely consumer confusion, courts have generally followed
the eight factor test developed by the Second Circuit in Polaroid Corp.
v. Polarad Electronics Corp.77 The Polaroid criteria require courts to ex-
amine: (i) the strength of the trade dress, (ii) the similarity of the
trade dress, (iii) the competitive proximity of the products, (iv)
whether the original dress owner will bridge the competitive gap ex-
isting between the products, (v) whether actual confusion is occur-
ring, (vi) good faith defenses, (vii) the quality of the infringer's
product, and (viii) the sophistication of the buyers.78 In this manner,
courts address each question of confusion ad hoc, weighing each fac-
tor to determine if, on balance, a likelihood of confusion exists. 79 Un-
fortunately, this test suffers from an acute problem of "open texture"
because none of the criteria weighed in the determination are individ-
software. At the lowest level of the computer's "thinking" hierarchy are the instructions
(or code) that inform the computer how to perform such functions as drawing windows,
layering windows, and controlling mouse input, to name a few. These commands are hard
coded into the computer. In other words, this instruction mix or systems' code is always
present in the computer. In this manner, any software which wishes to create several
layered windows "calls" what is in effect a sub-routine permanently stored in the com-
puter's ROM (Read Only Memory). Because this fundamental sub-routine is stored at the
systems level (and hence is static for all applications), many programs from dissimilar pro-
ducers appear to the end-user to function identically because they all necessarily share the
fundamental algorithms that drive the computer's basic functions and calculations (layer-
ing windows, for example).
75 Veryfine Prods. Inc. v. Colon Bros., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 240, 251 (D. P.R. 1992).
76 See, e.g., Fuddruckers, Inc. v. Doc's B.R. Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 845 (9th Cir.
1987) (stating that "if consumers believe that Doc's [the infringer] runs Fuddruckers [the
owner of the trade dress], and they are disappointed with the quality of Doc's food or
service, they may be deterred from patronizing Fuddruckers").
77 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
78 These eight criteria-the so-called "Polaroid factors"-have been well received and
are employed by several circuits. See e.g., International Kennel Club v. Mighty Star, Inc.,
846 F.2d 1079, 1087 (7th Cir. 1988); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d
Cir. 1983); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983);
McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1130 (2d Cir. 1979). Although the
Polaroid factors are not intended to be exhaustive, courts seem reluctant to involve outside
variables in their calculus. Some circuits purport to develop their own criteria, but these
factors typically differ in no substantial manner from those in Polaroid. The First Circuit,
for example, articulated eight factors to consider when determining whether confusion is
likely to occur. Although the nomenclature differs slightly, the substantive impact is identi-
cal. See Boston Athletic Ass'n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1989).




ually dispositive.8 0 Therefore, much room remains for judicial activ-
ism under the guise of the Polaroid test.
1. Strength of the Mark or Trade Dress
The focus under this factor is on the "distinctiveness of the mark,
or more precisely, its tendency to identify the goods sold under the
mark as emanating from a particular, although possibly anonymous
source."81 Furthermore, two additional criteria guide courts in assess-
ing the strength of a dress: (i) the degree to which the mark is inher-
ently distinctive, and (ii) the degree to which it has acquired
secondary meaning by becoming distinctive in the marketplace.8 2 It is
important to note, however, that courts may measure the strength of
trade dress in two different manners. First, trade dress consisting en-
tirely of arbitrary elements is inherently "stronger" and thus merits
more protection than dress involving less arbitrary elements. Second,
courts deem trade dress that possesses greater market penetration as
stronger and worthy of greater protection since consumers rely upon
the distinctive dress to identify the source of the product's origin.
2. Similarity of the Marks
In conducting this inquiry courts consider the general impression
that the dress creates, "keeping in mind all factors which the buying
public will likely perceive and remember."83 For computer software
the inquiry may focus on the placement of the command predicates,8 4
the placement and configuration of the menu hierarchy or menu bar,
the use of unique or nonobvious identifiers to invoke command pred-
icates, and the overall "look and feel" of the interface. In many re-
spects, however, this gestalt inquiry begs the ultimate question that
this Note analyzes-whether the "look and feel" of a software interface
is protectable under the Lanham Act.
3. Competitive Proximity of the Products
Under this Polaroid factor, courts determine whether the goods
generally compete in the same product market, because, "[t] o the ex-
80 Id. See also Plus Prods. v. Plus Discount Foods, Inc., 722 F.2d 999, 1004 (2d Cir.
1983) (in determining likelihood of confusion the appropriate analysis is to consider and
balance all of the Polaroid factors).
81 McGregor-Doniger, Inc. v. Drizzle Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1131 (2d Cir. 1979). See also
W.W.W. Pharmaceutica4 984 F.2d at 572 (citing McGregor-Doniger with approval).
82 See W.W.W. Pharmaceutica4 984 F.2d at 572.
83 Id.
84 "Command predicate" denotes a programming call which invokes some function of
the program. For example, a call that activates a portion of the interface to load or save a
program is a "command predicate." Thus, the unique placement or designation of an icon
or menu hierarchy that invokes some particular program feature warrants examination in
determining the similarity of the dress.
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tent goods ([or trade dress]) serve the same purpose, fall within the
same general class, or are used together, the use of similar designa-
tions is more likely to cause confusion." 5 Courts may consider
whether the products differ in content, geographic distribution, mar-
ket position, and audience appeal. 86 Hence, a spreadsheet interface
that proves particularly unique or acquires strong secondary meaning
in its market may not be protectable if another producer employs sim-
ilar "look and feel" in communications software or in a structural de-
sign program since both of these latter programs purportedly appeal
to a different audience-specifically, consumers of telecommunica-
tions or structural design applications. Unfortunately, because
software markets seem to possess the unique feature of collapsed con-
sumerism, this inquiry may prove moot from its inception.
"Collapsed consumerism" refers to the fact that identical software
consumers occupy diverse positions across the market spectrum. In
other words, it is highly unlikely that one uses a computer solely for the
task of spreadsheeting or telecommunicating. Individual users, or al-
ternatively a single class of users, purchase programs that perform a
variety of computational functions. For this reason, the market isola-
tion or independence that may arise for other goods collapses when
one discusses software. In short, attempts at subdividing the com-
puter software market into smaller submarkets fundamentally miscon-
strue the systemically unique nature of the market.8 7
4. Whether the Dress Owner Will Bridge the Gap
The relevant question under this inquiry is whether the senior
dress owner will enter the market occupied by the dress infringer.
Like the analysis under the previous factor, the unique nature of the
software industry largely renders this inquiry moot as well. Both col-
lapsed consumerism and the superfluidity of information transfer88
make it extremely likely a priori that a senior user will either bridge
the gap or, at a minimum, suffer harm through unauthorized use of
85 Lang v. Retirement Living Publishing Co., 949 F.2d 576, 582 (2d Cir. 1991). Obvi-
ously, if confusion is more likely to occur then the senior user's dress warrants protection.
86 C.L.S.S. Promotions, Inc. v. D.S. Magazines, Inc., 753 F.2d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1985).
87 One may, of course, to some extent differentiate software markets in terms of their
computational platform. However, to divide the DOS market, for instance, into a DOS
telecommunications market and a DOS spreadsheet market denies the reality of collapsed
consumerism. To put it differently, the very nature of the market for software requires a
broader definition.
88 The computer industry tends to exhibit super-fluidity because information and
programming techniques typically disseminate quickly throughout the entire market. If
one manufacturer produces an especially sleek or efficient application, competing produ-
cers will likely discover this innovation virtually as soon as it is revealed to the public. Mass
telecommunication systems such as America-on-Line, Compuserve and the Internet all pro-
vide ample and speedy forums for this information interchange.
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its dress. In other words, unlike most product markets, the relative
ease of program translation and the existence of consumer unity cre-
ate significant economic incentives for producers to bridge platform
gaps in virtually all cases of software success.89
5. Actual Confusion
Evidence of individual instances of actual consumer confusion
supports the claim that there exists a likelihood of confusion for the
entire consuming class. Unfortunately, this evidentiary question is
generally quite difficult to assess.90 Moreover, although in most juris-
dictions the plaintiff need not prove actual confusion in order to pre-
vail, at least one circuit has held that "it is certainly proper for the trial
judge to infer from the absence of actual confusion that there was also
no likelihood of confusion."91 Further, in at least two circuits,
whether one must prove actual confusion or a likelihood of confusion
differs depending upon whether injunctive or monetary relief is being
sought.92
6. Defendant's Good Faith Defense
Because protection of trade dress is grounded in the tort of palm-
ing off, an infringer can often escape liability if the infringer adopted
the dress without the intention of capitalizing on the owner's good
will.93 Good faith may exculpate an infringement, for example, if the
89 A casual observation reveals that publishers produce most successful programs
across a spectrum of computational platforms.
90 See, e.g., Mushroom Makers, Inc. v. R.G. Barry Corp., 580 F.2d 44,48 (2d Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116 (1979) (citing cases where this difficulty was addressed).
91 Affiliated Hosp. Prod., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 1188 (2d Cir.
1975); McGregor-Doniger Inc. v. Drizzle, Inc., 599 F.2d 1126, 1136 (2d Cir. 1979).
92 See, e.g., Conopco, Inc. v. May Department Stores Co., No. 92-1412, 1994 WL
511280, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 21, 1994) ("To establish entitlement to monetary relief, a
plaintiff must show actual confusion, while to establish entitlement to injunctive relief, it is
sufficient if the plaintiff establishes likelihood of confusion."); Woodsmith Publishing Co.
v. Meredith Corp., 904 F.2d 1244, 1247 n.5 (8th Cir. 1990) ("Proof of actual confusion is
necessary for an award of damages. In order to obtain injunctive relief, proof of likelihood
of confusion is required."); Co-Recht Products, Inc. v. Marryl Advertising Photo Inc., 780
F.2d 1324, 1329-30 (8th Cir. 1985) (owner of mark entitled to injunctive relief if use causes
likelihood of confusion, but if use causes actual confusion then owner is entitled to dam-
ages); Warner Bros. Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 658 F.2d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Although it is
necessary to prove that the buying public was actually deceived in order to recover dam-
ages under § 43(A) of the Lanham Act, only a likelihood of confusion or deception need
be shown in order to obtain equitable relief." (citations omitted)).
93 See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir.
1992). Furthermore, the Second Circuit has held that "a plaintiff must prove that an in-
fringer acted with willful deception before the infringer's profits are recoverable by way of
an accounting." Banff, Ltd. v. Colberts, Inc., 996 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir.) (quoting George
Basch Co. v. Blue Coral, Inc., 968 F.2d 1532, 1540 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 510
(1992)), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 599 (1993). But see Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker
Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 961 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Other than general equitable considerations,
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infringer adopted the "look and feel" either because it best expresses
the characteristics of the interface (thus qualifying as "descriptive" of
the product), or because the infringer did not know after reasonable
inquiry that the senior user possessed a similar dress.94
Unfortunately, the good faith defense, although well suited to the
realm of trademarks, seems a tenuous and illogical fit when applied to
software. First, although theoretically possible, it is difficult to concep-
tualize an interface that qualifies as truly descriptive of the product.95
Second, software development is a much more dynamic process than
the development present in other industries. Specifically, little eco-
nomic cost accrues to software firms that wish to investigate and copy
the "latest" interface or "look and feel."96 Therefore, as a practical
matter, a manufacturer's cry of serendipitous and independent devel-
opment generally stinks in its mouth.
On the other hand, what makes little sense when wielded as a
shield makes a great deal of sense when used a sword. Although the
defense of "good faith" seems illogical in the realm of computer
software, some plaintiffs may use a lack of good faith to overcome
other evidential burdens in the Polaroid test. The Second Circuit held,
for example, that "evidence of intentional copying [which is the oppo-
site side of the 'good faith' coin] raises a presumption that the second
comer intended to create a confusing similarity."97
there is no express requirement that the parties be in direct competition or that the in-
fringer wilfully infringe the trade dress to justify an award of profits."), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1879 (1993); Dorr-Oliver Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (N.D. Ill.
1993) (stating that the plaintiff may recover damages under the Lanham Act "even if de-
fendants acted in good faith.").
94 Registration on the Lanham Act's primary register, however, removes the good
faith defense. In those instances where the first dress user registers the dress, this registra-
tion places all junior users on constructive notice.
95 An obvious exception involves the implementation of virtual reality interfaces.
Even in this forward looking application, however, purely descriptive interfaces are diffi-
cult to conceptualize. Contrast this result with other types of products for which this con-
clusion is not so tenuous. The lemon-shaped container that holds lemon juice is an
example.
96 One could object that copying a complex and truly unique interface would require
a large expenditure of time and money. Consider, for example, one who wishes to mimic
the Microsoft Windows interface. We must carefully distinguish, however, an effort to copy
Windows qua Windows, from an effort to mimic the "look and feel" of the software. Invok-
ing a menu bar at the top of a screen, with rectangular, overlapping boxes containing
picto-graphic icons certainly presents no great programming feat. In short, distinguishing
the effort of copying the software itself from an effort to copy the "look and feel" of the
software is crucial.
97 Charles of the Ritz Group Ltd. v. Quality King Distributors, Inc., 832 F.2d 1317,




7. Quality of the Infringer's Product
If the infringing product is inferior in quality when compared
with the senior product then the senior user has a right to protect
"the good reputation associated with his mark from the possibility of
being tarnished by inferior merchandise of the junior user."98 This
scenario is easy to imagine, and indeed borders on commonplace in
the software industry. Because individual style and expertise in writ-
ing program code directly influences the elegance, speed, and sophis-
tication of the interface, a sloppy effort by the programmer at the
planning or coding stages of software development can render a po-
tentially useful interface quite clumsy. Damage to the original de-
signer's reputation could occur if consumers are likely to believe that
the designer either wrote this clumsy interface or somehow approved
of its use by the infringer. Note, however, that this factor also begs the
question as to whether consumer confusion is likely to occur because
it assumes confusion at the beginning of the inquiry. In other words,
although potential injury to the owner's reputation is useful in deter-
mining the relevant equities, this injury does not facilitate the primary
inquiry: whether confusion is likely to take place.
8. Sophistication of Buyers
The final Polaroid factor examines the sophistication of the rele-
vant purchasers. Courts should properly consider "It]he general im-
pression of the ordinary purchaser, buying under the normally
prevalent conditions of the market and giving the attention such pur-
chasers usually give in buying that class of goods."9 9 This final inquiry
is problematic for reasons this Note articulates in Part IIA.00 In
short, software purchasers vary greatly in their level of purchasing so-
phistication and cannot be assumed to be a homogeneous group with
respect to their sophistication and purchasing knowledge. 01 For this
reason, buyer sophistication is generally unhelpful when analyzing
software industries, unless courts render a finding of fact concerning
98 Scarves by Vera, Inc. v. Todo Imports Ltd., 544 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1976).
99 W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 575 (2d Cir. 1993) (quot-
ing 3 RUDOLF CAL.uAN, THE LAW OF UNFAMR COMPETTON, TRADEMARKS, AND MONOPOLIES
§ 81.2, at 577 (3d ed. 1969)).
100 Specifically, a precise determination of the composition of the relevant market is
difficult to ascertain. The reader is directed to the discussion comparing MIS organiza-
tions with end-user consumers. See supra part IIA. When viewing these two groups as
aggregates, the former class is surely more sophisticated than the latter.
101 The potential for differences in sophistication and levels of understanding for any
given group of users becomes more acute with the development of the information super-
highway. In this medium, users of every level of sophistication mutually interact.
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the sophistication of the relevant market-an inquiry itself fraught
with peril.10 2
9. Additional Remarks
The Second Circuit developed the Polaroid criteria to test the like-
lihood of consumer confusion with respect to trademarks. Trade dress
protection proceeds under the common law developed for bland
trademark applications-trade dress' city cousin. Indeed, the Two Pe-
sos decision implies that similar analysis is appropriate for both trade
dress and trademark claims.' 03 However, in the "look and feel" realm
of software, the parallel development and like substantive features of
trademarks with respect to trade dress do not possess the degree of
similarity sufficient to justify identical treatment. Courts must articu-
late other criteria to govern the likelihood of confusion in the
software context. The Polaroid factors must expand and grow as tech-
nology expands and alters the trade dress landscape.
New criteria for determining the likelihood of confusion could
stem from existing factors. The similarity of computing platforms, for
example, parallels competitive proximity of products.10 4 However,
trade dress appearing in one computing platform may not warrant
protection when imitated on a competing platform. A GUI which ap-
pears in UNIX for mainframe use, for example, would likely fall
outside the scope of trade dress protection when applied to the MS-
DOS environment because the platforms are so substantially dissimi-
lar.105 On the other hand, the same GUI appearing in O/S 2 proba-
102 See, e.g., Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural Software, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 576,
580, 584 (E.D. La. 1991) ("Given the relatively insular and sophisticated nature of the
offshore engineering community (the apparent main users of SACS and StruCAD) they
are not prone to confuse the two software products."; "Even if the origin and trade dress of
SACS is recognizable by some engineers [the relevant market for the CAD program], the
market itself is sufficiently sophisticated that such confusion is questionable.").
103 This is so because both causes of action find their genesis in similar portions of the
Lanham Act and, moreover, share in the common-law tradition of the tort of "palming" or
"passing" off. See supra part I.B.
104 A "computing platform" describes the overall style and "common denominator" of
a given system. For example, MS-DOS is one platform, while Apple's System 7.0 is another.
Typically, an application that runs on one platform will not perform when directly invoked
in another platform. Introduction of the new line of "Power PC" products will necessarily
occlude this analysis. These computers will accept programs from both the Apple Macin-
tosh and MS-DOS environments. Just as this Note argues that collapsed consumerism is a
peculiar feature of the computer market, so too will collapsed computing platforms provide
peculiar twists to the traditional trade dress analysis.
105 This conclusion of law was reached in EngineeringLDynamics, 785 F. Supp. at 584. In
Engineering Dynamics the court held that "StruCAD's initial compatibility with personal
computers, which SACS [originally directed solely towards the mainframe market]
achieved some time later, also militates to some extent against the likelihood of confusion
between StruCAD and SACS. Accordingly, protectable trade dress does not reside in the
... look and feel of SACS." Id.
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bly deserves protection in the MS-DOS environment because these
operating systems are direct competitors. Accordingly, courts must re-
main both technologically-informed and open-minded as computa-
tional platforms increasingly become the source of litigation.
Although Polaroid continues to serve valid doctrinal purposes, it must
not be allowed to stifle new arguments developed in light of advanc-
ing technology.
D. Functionality as a Defense to Infringement
A plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of trade dress infringe-
ment under section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act if the plaintiff is able to
show that the trade dress is distinctive, either inherently so or through
acquired secondary meaning, and that a likelihood of consumer con-
fusion exists. In spite of this factual showing, an infringer may avoid
liability by proving that the allegedly infringing trade dress feature is
functional or mandated by functional concerns.' 06 It is important to
note that courts, and not Congress, have required that protected trade
dress elements be limited to "nonfunctional" features.' 0 7 Courts have
embraced the functionality argument because the purpose of the
functionality defense is "to protect advances in functional design from
being monopolized [so as] . . . to encourage competition and the
broadest dissemination of useful design features." 08
In Inwood Laboratories Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc. the United States
Supreme Court stated that "[i] n general terms, a product feature is
functional if it is essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it
affects the cost or quality of the article."' 0 9 The Court concluded that
Some readers will no doubt immediately note that even where computational plat-
forms are substantially dissimilar, protection should nevertheless accrue because of the
threat of reverse association. While this argument may no doubt be raised without embar-
rassment, confusion is a multi-variant calculus in which platform similarity is a single varia-
ble. This Note merely suggests that Polaroid, while insightful and helpful, is nevertheless
limited when applied to a growing and yet emerging technology. Growing pains and misfit
criteria are to be expected.
106 See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758 ("It is also clear that eligibility for protection under
§ 43(a) depends on nonfunctionality."); Inwood Labs. v. Ives Labs., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n.10
(1981); Villeroy & Boch Keramische Werke K.G. v. THC Sys., Inc., 999 F.2d 619 (2d Cir.
1993).
107 See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2760. See also In re Morton-Norwich Prods., 671 F.2d
1332, 1336 (C.C.PA- 1982) (holding that only nonfunctional features warrant protection);
Inwood Labs., 456 U.S. at 857-58 n.20 (arguing in dicta that only nonfunctional elements
merit protection).
108 Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 331 (2d Cir. 1983).
109 456 U.S. at 850 n.10. See also Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122
(1938) ("The evidence is persuasive that this form [of the trade dress in question] is func-
tional-that the cost of the biscuit would be increased and its high quality lessened if some
other form were substituted for the pillow-shape."). The statement in Kellogg, however, is
dicta and the Court does not precisely indicate what effect a finding of functionality has.
Additionally, Two Pesos takes for granted that the Lanham Act requires a finding of
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a prescribed medication's blue and white capsules were functional to
patients as well as to doctors and hospitals for various reasons: elderly
patients often commingle medications in one container and rely on
color to differentiate one medication from another, and patients asso-
ciate therapeutic effect with the medication's color." 0 Although the
discussion of functionality in Inwood Laboratories is clearly dicta, all ju-
risdictions allow infringers to defend themselves on grounds of func-
tionality."' This is entirely logical because to hold otherwise would
establish a de facto monopoly in a trade dress necessary both to the
product itself and to the product's class, and would therefore contra-
vene the social and economic policies animating the Lanham Act. Be-
cause the objectives of the Lanham Act differ markedly from that of
the Patent Act, for example," 2 protecting functionally dictated trade
dress would defeat the purposes of the Lanham Act." 3
Although the courts of appeals differ in the precise terms they
use to define "functional" trade dress," 4 a common thread emerges.
Namely, a functional trade dress is one which other producers would
need to mimic in order to compete effectively." 5 Additionally, if few
nonfunctionality before the Act's protection accrues. This statement, however, is also dic-
tum. 112 S. Ct. at 2760. The Courts of Appeals have concluded that trade dress functional-
ity, as with functional findings in copyright, will serve as a defense to putative infringement.
110 Inwood Labs, 456 U.S. at 853.
M See Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2758 ("It is also clear that eligibility for protection under
§ 43(a) depends on nonfunctionality."). The High Court's statement makes it unclear on
whom the burden of proving functionality initially rests. Some circuits conclude that it is
part of the plaintiff's prima facie case, while others allow the defendant to raise the claim
as an affirmative defense. See, e.g., Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir.
1987) (the leading minority view that the plaintiff possesses the burden of proof once the
defendant raises the issue). Cf. LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71 (2d Cir.
1985) (functionality is a defense and the burden is on the defendant to prove functional-
ity); Vaughan Mfg. Co., v. Brikam International Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987)
("Functionality is a defense to a suit brought under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act")
(citing W.T. Rogers Co. & Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 338 (7th Cir. 1985)); Brunswick Corp. v.
Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513,520 (10th Cir. 1987) ("We agree with the Second Circuit that
the question of functionality should be characterized as a defense."). Because of the na-
ture of the defense, however, regardless of on whom the burden first rests, one of the
parties involved will almost surely raise the issue, requiring a response from the opposing
party.
112 The Lanham Act serves to foster clarity and identification in the marketing of
goods and services, whereas the Patent Act promotes short-run monopolistic gains.
113 See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1336 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (stating
that "[t]his requirement of 'nonfunctionality' is not mandated by statute, but 'is deduced
entirely from court decisions.' It has as its genesis the judicial theory that there exists a
fundamental right to compete through imitation of a competitor's product, which right
can only be temporarily denied by the patent or copyright laws." (citations omitted)).
114 When examining the decisions of the courts of appeals, the Supreme Court, and
the 1990 Restatement of Unfair Competition, one discovers at least eleven different defini-
tions for "functionality." SeeJ. THOMAS MCCARnm, 1 MCCART ON TRADEMARKS AND UN-
FAIR COMPETITION § 7.26(3) (a) (1993).
115 Defining "effective competition" is no simple task, and the circuits differ in their
approaches. Some view effective competition as a question of product utility (de facto
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available alternative designs exist, or if the alternative designs are
available only at increased cost resulting in disproportionate eco-
nomic inefficiency, then trade dress is functionally required and will
not be protected." 6 Furthermore, trade dress inquiry focuses on
"whether the whole collection of elements taken together are func-
tional .... [F]unctional elements that are separately unprotectable
can be protected together as part of a trade dress."" 7 Thus, at least
two circuits have held that one may have a protectable trade dress
interest in a combination of product features that includes one or
more functional features, so long as the totality of features is
nonfunctional." 8
Computer lawyers must be careful, however, to distinguish trade
dress that is de facto functional from that-which is dejure functional.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals noted that the term "func-
functionality), while the preferred view, in this author's opinion, focuses upon economic
competition (or de jure functionality). A detailed analysis of these competing views
follows.
116 At least five circuits express these notions in similar form. See, e.g., LA. Gear Inc. v.
Thorn McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1129 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that "[i]f products having
the same utility can not be made without duplicating the design, the product design is
deemed essential to the function and is not protectable as a matter of trade dress"), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993); Computer Care v. Service Sys. Enters., 982 F.2d 1063, 1071
(7th Cir. 1992) (stating that "[p]ut another way, a functional feature is one that 'would be
found in most or all brands of the product even if no producer had any desire to have his
brand mistaken for that of another producer.' It is a feature, such as the oval shape of a
football, 'that competitors would find necessary to incorporate into their product in order
to be able to compete effectively' " (quoting Vaughan Mfg. v. Brikarn Intl. Inc., 814 F.2d,
346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987))); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 519 (10th Cir.
1987) ("Similarly, we adopt a test whose focus is the effect on competition."); Fuddruckers,
Inc. v. Doc's B.RI Others, Inc., 826 F.2d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 1987) ("A product feature is
functional if it is essential to the product's use or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article." (citation omitted)); Sicilia Di. R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir.
1984) (A functional "design... is only one of a limited number of equally efficient options
and free competition would be unduly hindered by according that design trademark pro-
tection."). See also Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. of America, 802 F. Supp. 1386, 1398
(D.S.C. 1992) (stating that "[t]he availability of alternative designs is a key factor in deter-
mining functionality... A design is functional 'if it is one of only a limited number of
efficient options available to competitors.'" Furthermore, "[flunctionality is not limited to
product features which are essential to the operation of the product. Thus, the color of a
product may be functional." (citations omitted)), rev'd, 9 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing that grounds for cancellation of registration of a trademark which is more than five
years old are limited to grounds explicitly set forth in cancellation statute and do not in-
clude functionality), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2134 (1994).
117 Fuddruckers, 826 F.2d at 842.
118 See Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1987) ("If, seen
as a whole, the design or trade dress 'primarily serves a legitimate trademark purpose-
identifying the source of the product-... [it is) eligible for protection' even though it
might also serve functional purposes." (quoting LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d
71, 78 (2d Cir. 1985))); American Greetings Corp. v. Dan-Dee Imports, Inc., 807 F.2d 1136
(3d Cir. 1986); Isaly Co. v. Kraft, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 983 (M.D. Fla. 1985), rev'd in part sub
nm. AmBrit, Inc. v. Kraft, Inc., 805 F.2d 974 (11th Cir.), supereded, 812 F.2d 1531 (11th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
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tional" has two distinct connotations, which courts often confuse in
their decisions.'1 9 De facto functionality connotes "functionality" in
the lay sense, "indicating that although the design of a product, a
container, or a feature of either is directed to the performance of a
function, it may be legally recognized as an indication of source." 20 A
product feature that is de facto functional may be afforded protection.
The legally relevant inquiry centers on de jure functionality.
Dejure functionality, on the other hand, identifies a purely legal
conclusion, irrespective of whether the feature concerned is directed
to the performance of a function. Thus, the pertinent question is
what elements precede this conclusion. The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals reasoned that the definition of de jure functionality
follows from a two step syllogism. First, "functional" means "utilita-
rian." Second, " 'utilitarian' means 'superior in function (de facto) or
economy of manufacture,' which 'superiority' is determined in light
of competitive necessity to copy."12 1 Therefore, in determining
whether a product element is de jure functional, courts ask whether
protection of the element from imitation will unreasonably interfere
with a competitor. 22 De jure functionality, in other words, balances
the Lanham Act's goals of proscribing unfair competition and false
designation of origin against economic efficiency.
In what manner, therefore, do courts determine what trade dress
is functional or superior in utility or economy of manufacture? At
least three factors are available for the legal calculus of functionality
and superiority of design. First, the existence of an expired utility pat-
ent that discloses the utilitarian advantage of the design seeking trade
dress protection may be evidence that the dress is functional. 12 3 How-
ever, because software interfaces generally fall outside the scope of
patents,124 this factor is not helpful. Second, if the originator touts
119 See In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1337 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1339.
122 See, e.g., Stormy Clime, 809 F.2d at 977 ("[A] critical aspect in considering hindrance
to competition is whether bestowing trade dress protection on a product design prevents
potential competitors from entering a market that is not foreclosed by a valid patent.");
Sicilia Di. Ri. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 429 (5th Cir. 1984) (stating that "[t]he
ultimate inquiry concerning functionality... is whether characterizing the feature or con-
figuration as protected 'will hinder competition or impinge upon the rights of others to
compete effectively in the sale of goods' " (quoting Morton-Nwch, 671 F.2d at 1342));
Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir. 1976) (stating that
"[t]he question in each case is whether protection against imitation will hinder the com-
petitor in competition"); Isaly, 619 F. Supp. at 991 ("In determining whether trade dress is
primarily non-functional, the test is whether upholding an exclusive right to use the trade
dress as a whole would hinder effective competition by others.").
123 See, e.g., Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co., 413 F.2d 1195, 1199 (C.C.P.A. 1969);
Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Storage Battery Co., 405 F.2d 901, 902 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
124 The Patent and Trademark Office (the "PTO") regularly grants patents to software
manufacturers. Encryption algorithms, for example, have obtained patents from the PTO.
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the utilitarian advantages and features of the design in its advertising,
courts may infer a claim of functionality. 125 This Note argues in Part
II.A that software manufacturers are well advised to advertise in ad-
vance of distribution of software to establish the secondary meaning of
their trade dress before the possibility of infringement arises. How-
ever, if advertisements emphasize the utilitarian features of the inter-
face too much, they may actually cripple the originator's later claim of
infringement. Finally, when determining whether trade dress is func-
tional or superior in utility, the existence of no other cost-effective
and efficient design alternative is significant.126 This final criterion
provides the most trouble for publishers seeking to avoid claims that
their GUIs are functional, and must be explored more fully.
One can foresee at least two distinct claims with respect to the
cost-efficiency of a software's "look and feel." First, the infringing de-
veloper could argue that the interface is functional because it repre-
sents the cheapest design available to achieve the desired end. Thus,
the infringer might assert that flow-charting, data manipulation, and
program code constraints (or, alternatively, inherent program lan-
guage efficiencies) require this particular "look and feel." This is the
argument from developmental efficiency.127 A second, unrelated argument
applies mostly to programs that require substantial computational re-
sources to achieve the program's desired result.128 In this scenario,
the infringer could argue that a need for computational speed and
efficiency dictates the interface or the program's "look and feel." In
other words, although other interfaces exist that could be developed
with little pecuniary harm to the manufacturer, thus undermining the
argument from developmental efficiency, computational resources re-
quire this specific design. This is the argument from computational effi-
However, patents are frequently issued that fail when challenged in court. The PTO's
strategy appears to be one in which patents are issued upon minimal proof of fulfilling
statutory criteria, and competitors are then expected to challenge such patent grants.
More importantly, the United States Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the proposition
that computer algorithms, without more, present patentable subject matter. See, e.g.,
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 595 n.18 (1978). Furthermore, although software may war-
rant patent protection as part of a process or method claim, the interface qua interface will
almost surely fall outside the language of the patent claim.
125 See, e.g., In re Shenango Ceramics, Inc., 362 F.2d 287 (C.C.P.A. 1966); In re Deister
Concentrator Co., 289 F.2d 496 (C.C.P.A. 1961).
126 See, e.g., Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1148 (2d
Cir. 1987) ("[T]he fact that a design feature performs a function does not make it essential
to the performance of that function; it is instead the absence of alternative constructions
performing the same function that renders the feature functional."); In re Morton-Norwich
Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1341 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
127 The author's self-styled monikers for the argument from deveopmental efficiency and
the argument from computational efficien represent descriptions of obvious pragmatic
constraints.
128 An example is an application that must be run on a mainframe system.
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ciency. Under either argument putatively nonfunctional trade dress
would not be protectable because of de jure functionality.
Gregory Wrenn has argued that because the functionality argu-
ment focuses upon what is in effect economic impact, in those in-
stances where competitors may fairly compete without copying the
original manufacturer's trade dress, "protection should be extended
to such trade dress without regard to metaphysical distinctions between
de facto functional and de facto nonfunctional features."129 This con-
clusion is entirely correct. As suggested in In re Morton-Norwich Prod-
ucts, Inc.,130 this shifts the focus away from inquiries into bland
product utility and necessary functional causation and towards an in-
quiry into product identification and inequitable monopolistic results.
Wrenn suggests a bifurcated approach to GUI trade dress applica-
bility,' 3 ' upon which this Note expands, under which the state of the
computer market dictates the viability of the trade dress claim. Cer-
tain software markets possess established standard interface configura-
tions or GUIs. The Apple Systems software, for example, controls the
graphical displays observed by users from the systems or instruction
mix level. Although readers should not concern themselves with the
technological aspects involved, the practical implication is quite im-
portant-namely, third party software publishers all invoke the same
base level algorithms, or "system calls," thereby creating applications
that all possess a substantially similar GUI from the user's point of
view.'32 Thus, for example, the use of folders, the drawing of win-
dows, the movement of windows, and the placement and look of dia-
logue boxes appear similar throughout virtually all Apple
applications.
129 GregoryJ. Wrenn, Federal Intellectual Property Protection for Computer Software Audiovi-
sual Look and Feek The Lanham, Copyright, and Patent Acts, in 39 COPRGHT LAw SymPosiuM
1, 13 (1992). Note, however, that Wrenn invokes the locution about which Morton-Norwich
warned. Specifically, he applies a blanket definition of"functional" involving notions of de
facto functionality. A perusal of Wrenn, however, indicates that a more precise explana-
tion of his argument may be found in terms of de jure and de facto functionality without
reference to obscure metaphysics.
Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court tacitly adopts the dejure functionality analysis
advocated by Wrenn, Morton-Norwich, and this Note. In Two Pesos, the Court approved of
the Fifth Circuit's functionality evaluation:
Only nonfunctional, distinctive trade dress is protected under § 43(a). The
Fifth Circuit holds that a design is legally functional, and thus unprotect-
able, if it is one of a limited number of equally efficient options available to
competitors and free competition would be unduly hindered by according
the design trademark protection.
112 S. Ct. at 2760 (citing Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 426 (5th Cir.
1984)). Thus, even the High Court bears down on competitive possibility when analyzing
claims of functionality.
130 See supra note 119.
131 Wrenn, supra note 129, at 10-14.
132 See supra note 74.
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In software markets with such established standard interfaces,
consumers expect and demand that new applications adhere to these
standards.13 3 Broad trade dress protection in these markets would
prevent effective competition among similarly situated products and
should be avoided. Therefore, in markets with an established "stan-
dard interface," both the argument from computational efficiency and the
argument from developmental efficiency mitigate against granting trade
dress protection for GUIs.' 3 4 To return to the example of Apple's
system, protection of the basic "look and feel" of the Apple GUI would
force other Apple-oriented publishers to develop an alternative oper-
ating system. This is both computationally and developmentally ineffi-
cient, and thus requires a finding of de jure functionality. In other
words, the next best alternative GUI is economically prohibitive by
virtue of both development and implementation costs.
On the other hand, in markets lacking a standard interface the
case for de jure nonfunctionality gains force. The existence of alter-
native interfaces strongly implies that competitive efficiency is not
drastically affected by the existence of any particular interface. After
all, why would a competitor use its own interface when a "functionally"
dictated alternative is so clearly superior that its elements must be ren-
dered public domain to insure product competition? Consequently,
protection of one particular interface does not diminish the competi-
tive possibilities for other producers, since reasonable market alterna-
tives have already been established. The exception to this analysis,
however, occurs when a shift in technology renders an older interface
de jure inferior. In this scenario the existence of market alternatives
possesses no probative force because market maturation renders the
old market equilibrium inapplicable. A new market equilibrium must
be established with both the new technology and its attendant devel-
opment, computation, and competition costs firmly in mind. Never-
theless, exceptional cases aside, both the common-law tradition and
legislative history of the Lanham Act favor protection of distinguish-
ing trade dress where consumers recognize the source of a product's
origin through a GUI and secondary manufacturers seek to capture
market share through imitation of the successful GUI.'3 5
133 Foremost among the reasons for this consumer expectation is the fact that users
seek flat learning curves when acquiring new software. Indeed, economic efficiency is best
maintained where learning curves are kept relatively flat and short. This, of course, as-
sumes that the gains incurred in the relatively flatter learning curve are not offset when
weighed against any inefficiencies created by adherence to the "standard" interface when
compared to the ne best interface.
134 The threshold question remains, however, when does a GUI become "standard?"
Surely no rigid definition suffices here. Rather, common sense and findings of fact serve
as our guides.
135 Of course, protection will fail if the GUI's features are necessitated by the strict
terms of economic competition outlined above.
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As Professor Callmann recognizes, however, "[flunctionality is
often a matter of degree, rather than a binary yes-or-no matter."136 At
one polar end of the functionality spectrum rests perfectly standard
interfaces. Apple's System software GUI, for example, represents this
extreme position in the spectrum where trade dress protection should
not occur. At the other end of the continuum rests perfectly substitut-
able competing interfaces where protection of any individual variation
should accrue. In effect, because substitute interface configurations
exist, in these instances society suffers no economic harm through the
grant of protection. However, since cases that fall on the polar ex-
tremes are rare, Callman's admonition rings true. Indeed, the Second
Circuit was on the mark when it concluded that "[i]n between, the
case for protection weakens the more clearly the arrangement of al-
legedly distinctive features serves the purpose of the product (includ-
ing maintenance of low cost), especially where the competitor
copying such features has taken some significant steps to differentiate
its product. '1 37
Ultimately, determination of functionality represents a mixed
question of law and fact in which evidence of consumer confusion as
to source of product origin must both weigh against and be consonant
with prevention of substantial competitive inefficiency. The defense
of functionality represents the most severe threat to publishers seek-
ing trade dress protection for their unique GUIs. Indeed one com-
mentator asserts that interfaces are by definition functional and
therefore outside the scope of trade dress protection in toto.' 38 This
conclusion is clearly incorrect, but nevertheless alludes to the threat
functionality poses to publishers seeking the Lanham Act's protection.
With the three elements of a trade dress claim firmly in mind,
Two Pesos becomes highly relevant. The High Court's decision not
only alters the application of these three elements, but also, more im-
portantly, tacitly supports the argument that trade dress protection
extends to software interfaces under certain conditions.
III
Two P--sos v. TAco C4BANA
Two Pesos teaches intellectual property lawyers two fundamental
lessons. First, the decision settles a conflict among the circuits con-
cerning whether inherently distinctive trade dress merits Lanham Act
protection without a necessary showing of secondary meaning. Sec-
136 RUDOLF CAU.mANN, 3 THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOP-
ouEs § 19.33, at 32 (1983).
137 Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971, 977 (2d Cir. 1987).
138 See Ken Liebman et al., The Shape of Things to Come: Trademark Protection for Com-
puter, 12 PRENTICE HALL LAw Am BusmNEss: COMPUTER LAw 1 (1992).
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ond, the majority's expansive interpretation of both trade dress and
"look and feel" provides ample justification for the argument that
GUIs meeting the three substantive criteria outlined above fall within
the Lanham Act's ambit of protection.
A. Factual Basis Giving Rise to the Dispute
Respondent Taco Cabana operated a chain of fast food restau-
rants, which were located in Texas. By 1985 respondent owned five
restaurants in the San Antonio area.'3 9 Taco Cabana employed an
unusual trade dress which created a festive Mexican dining experi-
ence. Respondent described its dress as follows:
[a] festive eating atmosphere having interior dining and patio areas
decorated with artifacts, bright colors, paintings and murals. The
patio includes interior and exterior areas with the interior patio ca-
pable of being sealed off from the outside patio by overhead garage
doors. The stepped exterior of the building is a festive and vivid
color scheme using top border paint and neon stripes. Bright aw-
nings and umbrellas continue the theme. 140
Petitioner Two Pesos opened a restaurant in Houston which em-
ployed a motif very similar to that present in respondent's loca-
tions.141 Subsequently, Taco Cabana expanded into the Houston
market, where Two Pesos was doing business, and brought suit in the
Southern District of Texas for trade dress infringement pursuant to
section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act. The trial court instructed the jury
that Taco Cabana's trade dress was protected if it either was inherently
distinctive or had acquired secondary meaning. The Fifth Circuit af-
firmed the trial court's statement of the law in this regard, following
precedent from that circuit. 42 In stark contrast, the Second Circuit in
Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Body Boutique'43 held that trade dress which
fails to possess secondary meaning, even if it is inherently distinctive,
will not be protected by the Lanham Act. The Supreme Court, there-
fore, granted certiorari "to resolve the conflict among the Courts of
Appeals on the question whether trade dress which is inherently dis-
'39 Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2755.
140 Id. (quoting Taco Cabana Int'l, Inc. v. Two Pesos, Inc., 932 F.2d 1113, 1117 (5th
Cir. 1991)).
141 The Fifth Circuit found that "[t ] he weight of the evidence persuades us, as it did
Judge Singleton, that Two Pesos brazenly copied Taco Cabana's successful trade dress, and
proceeded to expand in a manner that foreclosed several lucrative markets within Taco
Cabana's natural zone of expansion." Taco Cabana, 932 F.2d at 1127 n.20.
142 Id. See Chevron Chemical Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695,
702 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that trade dress warrants protection if it is inherently distinc-
tive or if it may be proven to have acquired secondary meaning), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126
(1982).
143 652 F.2d 299 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982).
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tinctive is protectable under § 43 (a) without a showing that it has ac-
quired secondary meaning."144
B. The Court's Decision and Rationale
Justice White's majority opinion focuses. on the text of section
43 (a) and concludes that no statutory reason exists for treating inher-
ently distinctive verbal or symbolic trademarks differently from inher-
ently distinctive trade dress. 145 In an effort to comport parallel
analysis into the Lanham Act, the majority notes that there is "no basis
for requiring secondary meaning for inherently distinctive trade dress
protection under § 43(a) but not for other distinctive words, symbols,
or devices capable of identifying a producer's product."146 Moreover,
requiring secondary meaning to manifest itself in trade dress which is
inherently distinctive would defeat the purposes of the Lanham Act.
"By making more difficult the identification of a producer with its
product, a secondary meaning requirement for a nondescriptive trade
dress would hinder improving or maintaining the producer's competi-
tive position."' 47 In other words, because inherently distinctive trade
dress is capable of identifying the source of the product's origin, pro-
tection under section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act accrues without fur-
ther proof that the dress has acquired secondary meaning. Therefore,
relying upon both statutory construction and the statute's animating
purposes, the Supreme Court established protection for inherently
distinctive trade dress even where the market has yet to identify any
one particular producer with the product. 148
C. Two Pesos' Implications for Intellectual Property
In Two Pesos the Supreme Court examined two similar restaurants
and held that although their overall appearance derived from furnish-
ings, paint, awnings, signs, and a garage door, the "look" of the restau-
rant was inherently distinctive. Since the Court found the "look" of a
restaurant inherently distinctive, computer lawyers will by analogy
quickly assert that screen displays or any other element of the software
which the public can observe, if distinct, will merit Lanham Act pro-
144 Two Pesos, 112 S. Ct. at 2757.
145 Id. at 2760.
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 This point is particularly crucial in the computer software market where successful
interfaces may find imitators hard at work before software consumers have the opportunity
to locate and identify the producer with any consistency. Because computer markets tend
to exhibit superfluidity in terms of product introduction and, similarly, product failure,
requiring secondary meaning to vest before protection may accrue seems particularly oner-
ous. See, e.g., id. at 2760-61.
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tection. Importantly, Lanham Act protection will accrue even where
these same elements would fail to qualify for copyright protection.
Unfortunately, the Two Pesos decision fails explicitly to delineate
standards for determining when inherent distinctiveness for the "over-
all impression" of a good obtains. The Court adopted with approval
Judge Friendly's categories of distinctiveness, thus his rubric appar-
ently represents the Court's view as well. 149 If so, the Court failed to
observe a critical distinction between trademark and trade dress. Spe-
cifically, although determining whether a word or phrase is fanciful,
arbitrary, or suggestive may be a relatively simple task, determining
whether a trade dress, such as a restaurant's decor or a GUI's impres-
sion, meets this test is quite another task. This latter finding is subjec-
tive rather than empirical and suffers from acute difficulties associated
with intuitive or impressionistic reasoning.150
Definitional difficulties aside, however, Two Pesos offers hope to
software producers because of the "Gestalt"' 1 ' view adopted by the
High Court Trade dress traditionally involved a product's packaging.
The Courts of Appeals subsequently expanded this common-law appli-
cation to encompass virtually any nonfunctional element that may be
observed by the public and used to identify a product's source of ori-
gin. The Supreme Court, however, had not affirmed such an expan-
sive interpretation of trade dress and had focused on more
"traditional" dress categories. 152 Therefore, Two Pesos implicitly stands
for the proposition that an expansive interpretation of trade dress is
consistent with Supreme Court views. In light of Two Pesos, therefore,
if a GUI meets the other substantive criteria established through com-
mon-law tradition, then trade dress protection should accrue.
149 This Note fully explores Friendly's categories in part II.B supra. Briefly, they are, in
decreasing order of distinctiveness: fanciful, arbitrary, suggestive, descriptive, and generic.
150 One commentator suggests:
To say that the overall design of a useful article is 'inherently distinctive' of
a particular source just by examining it and perhaps dissecting it, seems to
me an impermissible exercise of intuitive judging. It substitutes an impres-
sion that the design is outstanding, or eccentric, or clever, or something,
for the proofs of association with a source, gained in the marketplace, that
add up to a showing of secondary meaning.
Ralph Brown, Design Protection: An Overview, 34 UCLA L. Rxv. 1341, 1380 (1987). See also
JennyJohnson, Two Pesos v. Taco Cabana, Inc.: The Supreme Court's Expansion of TradeDress
Protection Under Section 43(a) of The Lanham Act, 24 Loy. U. Cri. L.J. 285 (1993) (analyzing
the legal and economic implications of the Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos).
151 The Court's view is characterized as "Gestalt" in form because it looks at the en-
tirety of the restaurant's interior before determining whether protection will accrue. In
other words, according to the Court, trade dress when examined as a whole may possess
attributes which its individual elements fail to possess singularly.
152 The encasing of prescribed medication in Inwood Laboratories, for example. See




FINAL COMMENTS ON TRADE DRESS AS APPLIED TO GUIs
A. The Requirement of Distinctiveness
A GUI acquires distinctiveness either because (i) it is inherently
so, or (ii) it has acquired secondary meaning. GUI protection stems
most easily from those instances in which the interface is inherently
distinctive. In the rapidly changing computer landscape, the length
of time required to establish secondary meaning could be quite long
relative to significant changes in technology-especially in those juris-
dictions where the product must acquire secondary meaning before the
putative infringement begins.153 Moreover, the lapse of time before
secondary meaning attaches could render the particular interface
configuration dejure functional as other manufacturers adopt similar
interface designs. With this in mind, GUIs which qualify as inherently
distinct stand on terra firma when compared with their secondary-
meaning brethren.
In Computer Care v. Service Systems Enterprises, Inc.,'54 the Seventh
Circuit commented that inherently distinctive trade dress must be
either arbitrary 55 or "sufficiently distinctive to allow consumers to
identify the product from the trade dress."' 56 Additionally, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that "uniqueness [with respect to other competitors
in the relevant market] supports a finding that a trade dress is inher-
ently distinctive.' u 57 Computer Care's broad definition supports this
Note's conclusion that dejure nonfunctional GUIs qualify for protec-
tion in those instances where consumers identify producers through
their GUIs.
Furthermore, because uniqueness and the ability to identify
source of origin define the scope of inherently distinctive GUIs, trade
dress protection accrues for the entire GUI rather than for individual
elements of the interface. The use of a mouse pointing device or of
layered windows, for example, would fail to be either unique or identi-
fying. Such interface devices have long since become standard fare
and as such are not protected either individually or as part of a total
interface.
153 See supra note 51.
154 982 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1992) (although this case relates to computer services, the
underlying trade dress claim concerns a printed form and is therefore a more traditional
trade dress analysis).
155 Some Circuits equate "arbitrary" with the Fifth Circuit's locution of"fanciful." The
difference is entirely semantic, and does not substantively affect one's trade dress claim.
156 Computer Care, 982 F.2d at 1069 (quoting Ambrit Inc. v. Kraft Inc., 812 F.2d 1531,




This is not to say, however, that all GUIs are now public domain.
Certainly the concept of a GUI'58 is public domain. Protection of any
interface which employs ic;ono-graphic features, window elements,
window layering, and a pointing device fails because of de jure func-
tionality-protection would unfairly and unnecessarily constrain com-
petition. However, specific' configurations or combinations of GUIs
certainly fall within the ainbit of both inherent distinctiveness and
nonfunctionality. Thus, although Apple surely lost its claim of general
protection for all GUI configurations, a narrower claim of protection
for a specific interface could still survive on the merits if a competing
interface is likely to cause consumer confusion. 5 9
Alternatively, a publisher could assert that its particular GUI pos-
sesses secondary meaning. As this Note argues in Part II.A, a sound
strategy for such publishers necessarily involves substantial advertise-
ment. Additionally, secondary meaning proves most efficacious in
those instances where one publisher produces a multitude of products
that each employ similarly designed interfaces. Microsoft, for exam-
ple, separately markets applications which perform spreadsheeting,
word processing, telecommunicating, and data retrieval functions,
among others. Through, the use of Microsoft's Windows program,
each of these distinct applications is able both to share and crosslink
data.160 Programs belonging to a family of applications, therefore, are
better placed to assert secondary meaning. First, if secondary mean-
ing occurs with respect to any individual program, the publisher pos-
sesses a strong claim that it attaches for all similarly situated GUIs
from that family of applications. Second, the publisher may argue
that secondary meaning is best measured through examination of the
entire family of applications. In both of these instances, the likeli-
hood that the finder of fact will ultimately determine that a product
feature possesses secondary meaning expands dramatically.161
158 As broadly defined earlier in note 3 supra. This refers to the concept of a graphical
interface qua graphical interfaces. For example, Apple no longer has a claim to interfaces
which are primarily graphical in toto. However, particular instances of GUIs are well within
the realm of protectable subject matter, provided they are nonfunctional.
159 See infra part IV.D.
160 Programs which possess a DDL (dynamic data link) are capable of not only sharing
data, but actually create cross files that integrate seemingly disparate applications. One
who creates a table in spreadsheet format via Excel, for example, may integrate that data
into a word processing document. The DDL feature automatically updates the word
processing document anytime the user invokes Excel to make changes to the spreadsheet
recreating the changes in the word processing document. In other words, altering data in
one application instantaneously updates all related files in which that data appears.
161 Moreover, companies which market a family of programs invoking the same inter-
face lower the "cost" of developing the GUI as the initial expenditure may be amortized
against the product line. Thus, interfaces which initially appear cost prohibitive may be
quite affordable in the long run.
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Finally, in jurisdictions following the, authority of the Ninth Cir-
cuit, directly copying an existing interfac ; creates the inference that
the GUI possessed secondary meaning. 162 Absent the affirmative de-
fense of functionality, this presumption 'is powerful tool for those
seeking protection of their proprietary interfaces. Moreover, because
"inherently distinct" does not translate well:into the realm of com-
puter software (at least when compared to the more traditional analy-
sis of a bottle, or book cover), circumvention of the inherently distinct
inquiry by means of this presumption is quJte advantageous.
B. Likelihood of Consumer Confusion
Polaroid's eight criteria outline the relevant inquiry courts invoke
to determine whether consumer confusion "is likely to occur. 163 Tech-
nological advances have largely altered the inquiry into consumer
confusion in software markets. Hardware manufacturers increasingly
announce inter-platform compatibility.164 In addition, the introduc-
tion of "Windows 4.0"165 further narrows. the gap between Windows-
type interfaces and competing interfaces, like Apple's. 166 For these
reasons, in addition to Polaroid's factors, this Note concludes that
courts must develop content specific criteria which address the
problems peculiar to the software industry.., Computational platform
differences, advances in the relevant technology, and collapsed com-
puter consumerism, although arguably subsets of Polaroids existing
criteria, become quite important (perhaps even controlling) in the
context of software markets and, theiefore, deserve explicit
articulation.
162 See supra part II.A.
163 This Note fully examines each criteria as applied to computer software markets in
supra part II.C.
164 A single computer that is able to run software developed for various, disjunct com-
puting platforms qualifies in this respect. Consider, for example, the newly announced
"PowerPC." If pre-release advertisements are accurate, this machine will be able to run
both MS-DOS and Apple (i.e., Macintosh) programs on a single computer.
165 Also referred to as "Windows Chicago" ip pre-release literature.
166 Since Windows 4.0 is an actual 32-bit operating system, the program controls all of
the fundamental or base level "calls" issued by any given program to the system level. In
this manner, all programs which make these system "calls," regardless of their source of
origin or original producer will appear quite similar to the end-user. In other words, all
applications, regardless of their manufacturer, will invoke the same programming sub-rou-
tines when performing certain base level funttions. Thus, although each manufacturer
will develop its own software, all programs "speal" the same language with respect to those
feature driving the interface and the user's perception of that GUI. Windows 4.0 creates a
barrier to broad trade dress protection in a mianner similar to that created by Apple's
systems software. See also supra note 74.
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C. Functionality As an Affirmative Defense
The defense of functionality creates the greatest burden for pub-
lishers seeking to protect their GUIs under the Lanham Act. Indeed,
one commentator concludes that this defense, without more, renders
trade dress inapplicable in the realm of computer software.167 An-
other group of authors argues that user interfaces are by their very
nature functional. 168 In other words, the interface represents the
method through which the user communicates with both the program
and the underlying central processing unit. Additionally, the inter-
face is the means through which the user obtains utility from the pro-
gram. Liebman, Frischling and Brunel conclude that "[w] hile specific
visual elements of the interface arguably might be protectable, most
elements of the user interface are intended to communicate or enable
a specific feature or operation, and thus would seem to be as func-
tional as the labels 'on' and 'off' on the computer's power switch."' 69
Failure to recognize the important distinction between de facto
and de jure functionality undoubtedly fosters opinions such as the
above. The legally relevant question focuses not on pure utility, but
rather on alternative competitive possibilities. This Note has argued
that in markets with an established standard, trade dress protection
for GUIs diminishes substantially, thereby alleviating the concerns ar-
ticulated by Liebman, Frischling and Brunel. Conversely, in markets
without any established standard interface, broader protection is con-
sonant with both the legislative history of the Lanham Act and the
common-law tradition of the various circuits.
D. An Application
Drawing from the legal headlines, an application involving Apple,
Inc. and Microsoft, Inc. seems to be both practical and useful. At the
core of this litigation rested Apple's contention that Microsoft in some
manner appropriated Apple's putatively proprietary design and imple-
mentation of the "window" concept for personal computer inter-
faces.' 70 Apple, in a suit based primarily upon copyright law, sought
$5.5 billion in damages for alleged infringement of its systems inter-
167 See supra note 7.
168 See Liebman et al., supra note 138.
169 Id.
170 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 799 F. Supp. 1006 (N.D. Cal. 1992), afjfd
in part; 35 F.3d 1435 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Victoria Slind-Flor, Computer War Comes Down
to Mere Pixels, NAT'L LJ., May 24, 1993, at 8; Paul Andrews, Microsoft Wins Key Ruling in Apple
Suit, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, April 16, 1992, at B6. The stakes are quite large. In 1992 Microsoft
sold 12 million copies of Windows worth $406 million. Additionally, Microsoft sold $1.3
billion worth of other programs that use the same interface. James Coates, Microsoft Tries to
Close a Window to Competitors, CHIcAGo TR:guNE, Mar. 1, 1993, at B3.
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face by Microsoft's wildly successful interface "Microsoft Windows." 17 1
Microsoft was largely successful in defending against the copyright in-
fringement alleged by Apple, and one naturally wonders why Apple
did not assert a trade dress claim together with its copyright infringe-
ment suit. Indeed, at least one commentator suggests that Apple's
attorneys may have "goofed" by failing to assert a Lanham Act cause of
action.172 Apple's lead counsel, Jack Bain of Brown & Bain, asserts,
however, that the decision not to raise a trade dress claim was quite
intentional.1 Following the analysis developed in this Note, Mr.
Bain's comment is not only candid, but accurate as well. In short,
although Apple arguably once possessed a trade dress cause of action,
its delay in bringing that action by some four or five years proves
fatal.174
As a threshold matter, Apple's interface system must either pos-
sess secondary meaning in the relevant market segment or be inher-
ently distinct. Considering the present state of the computer market,
Apple fails on both accounts. First, although Apple's System interface
no doubt possessed great secondary meaning several years ago, the
proliferation of similar interfaces largely robs the Apple interface of
this meaning. When the GUI was first introduced, before the success-
ful release of the Windows program, Apple's interface was surely a
sign of company good will and consumer identification. Computer
users intentionally purchased Apple products because of their ease of
use and user-friendly interface. Not too many years ago, Apple adver-
tised that their machine was for "the rest of us" who did not wish to
master the arcane commands and functions of MS-DOS. For Apple,
its early interface was entirely unique, nonfunctional and, most impor-
tantly, connoted both source of origin and consumer good will. No
other manufacturer had developed or marketed a GUI for the general
computing population.175 Consequently, the Apple interface indi-
cated the source of origin of the product when observed by most in-
dependent users of moderate computing sophistication.
In the last four years, however, much has changed in the comput-
ing landscape. The MS-DOS platform came to dominate the business
market and corporate managers demanded a more intuitive interface
171 Andrews, supra note 170.
172 See Slind-Flor, supra note 7.
173 I&
174 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Two Pesos, however, the future of trade
dress protection for GUIs was uncertain. No doubt this explains both Apple's reluctance
to bring a trade dress cause of action and the importance of Two Pesos to intellectual prop-
erty lawyers.
175 Some dispute exists concerning whether Apple appropriated its GUI concept from
the mainframe environment. Even if this is true, however, Apple was the first to market a
GUI for the mainstream personal computer user.
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for use in this environment. Microsoft's Windows stepped in to fill
the platform void. The initial versions of this program were cumber-
some, slow and bulky.17 6 With advances in processing power, how-
ever, the Windows interface attained true workhorse status. Because
Apple delayed its initial legal response until well after the crystalliza-
tion of Microsoft's market placement, much of Apple's good will and
secondary meaning had dissipated. Indeed, by 1991 when the litiga-
tion began, GUIs had become a generic descriptor of a type or style of
interface, and the use of a mouse, layered windows, a menu bar, and
the like were common.
Judge Friendly's categories of distinctiveness prove enlightening
here. A trade dress that at one time possessed a certain degree of
market power and distinctiveness had been rendered effectively generic
over time through a combination of both direct competition and a
failure to preserve the trade dress. Apple's own inaction in the face of
potential encroachment rendered its interface, like the lost trademark
"thermos," indeterminate.
What, then, of Apple's claim that its interface is inherently dis-
tinct? If Apple were successfully to prove its GUI distinct, then secon-
dary meaning need not obtain before Lanham Act protection could
be invoked. For Apple's interface to qualify as inherently distinct, it
must be deemed either suggestive, arbitrary or fanciful-an inquiry
fraught with potential peril. This Note's earlier criticism becomes sig-
nificant at this point. Surely judges can observe that a word like "Ko-
dak" is arbitrary when applied to photographic merchandise.
Likewise the trademark "Windex" is suggestive when applied to a glass
cleaner.177 On the other hand, how is one to determine whether an
interface, when considered in its entirety, qualifies as suggestive, arbi-
trary or fanciful? Clearly this is an ad hoc determination in which
both the common law and the language of the Lanham Act offer little
guidance. Arguably there is nothing distinctive in Apple's interface
that creates an "unexpected visual image." Although it was clearly
176 Windows version 2.0 was very slow, prone to locking up and generally difficult to
use in this author's opinion. Conversely, the Apple interface available in the same time
period was quite a bit easier to use and enjoy. This was due, in no small part, to the
increased computational power of the Motorola processing chip, which was present in the
Apple line of products, when compared to the early Intel chips (the 8086, 8088, and even
the 286). In other words, years ago Apple had little to fear. Microsoft's competing plat-
form lacked the raw computational power necessary to carry out the complex calculations
and data manipulations required seamlessly to invoke primarily graphical interfaces. Only
recently have Intel style chips packed enough punch to completely handle sleek and com-
parable graphical interfaces. Perhaps this explains Apple's sluggish legal response to the
Microsoft threat.
177 Some may even argue that "Windex" is fanciful. However, the inclusion of "Win" in




quite creative when it was developed, inherent distinctiveness is an-
other matter entirely. Nevertheless, one could argue without embar-
rassment that if this nation's highest court found Taco Cabana's decor
to be distinctive then surely the interface qualifies as well. At any rate,
this determination is largely one for the fact finder and would rely
heavily upon that fact finder's subjective conclusions.
In summary, as to the first criterion required for a trade dress
cause of action, Apple likely lost its claim of secondary meaning by
failing to act soon enough. Additionally, whether the interface is in-
herently distinct is largely a question of fact, although the author con-
cludes that the Apple GUI is not distinct in the sense developed by the
common law and codified in the Lanham Act and its congressional
comments.
Assuming, however, that Apple's GUI satisfies one of the afore-
mentioned tests, it is still necessary to determine whether the competi-
tor's product causes a likelihood of confusion. Mr. Bain, Apple's
counsel, noted that this issue makes the affirmative cause of action
stumble. 178 The thrust of Mr. Bain's point is that few consumers sit-
ting at an IBM compatible computer are likely to wonder if Apple
created the interface when Microsoft's trade name is clearly used
throughout the product and when the computing platforms are so
dissimilar. On this point, Mr. Bain is largely correct. However, re-
verse association could provide Apple with its necessary source of con-
fusion. Some users, although quite aware that Windows is produced
by Microsoft and Apple's System Interface by Apple, may nevertheless
conclude that a licensing agreement exists between the two compa-
nies, or that Microsoft is responsible for Apple's product. Those users
who are well informed, however, are unlikely to reach this conclusion.
Thus, on a purely intuitive level, Apple's ability to prove likelihood of
confusion seems coerced at best. Indeed, intuition aside, the Polaroid
factors lead to the identical conclusion-namely, that Apple cannot
sufficiently prove likelihood of consumer confusion.
Examination of each of the eight Polaroid factors leads to the con-
clusion that Mr. Bain was well advised to avoid asserting a trade dress
cause of action. First, Apple's trade dress is not particularly strong at
this point in time when compared with programming conventions em-
ployed by competing software manufacturers. In fact, the use of rec-
tangular windows, mouse input, a menu bar, radio boxes, click boxes,
and window minimization borders on the generic. 179 On the other
178 Slind-Flor, supra note 7, at I (Mr. Bain is reported to have said "After all, Microsoft
is spending millions of dollars to advertise their products as their products .... so where is
the confusion as to source?").
179 Although not all readers will immediately correlate actual program features with
their computerjargon titles (the "radio box," for example), the real point is that the inter-
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hand, the similarity of the two interfaces, Polaroid's second criterion,
mitigates slightly in Apple's favor. However, each system requires
unique command predicates for a user to invoke program functions.
Additionally, the windows themselves are aesthetically quite differ-
ent.'80 Thus, although Apple wins this variable in the Polaroid
calculus, the overall impact is nugatory. Third, Apple and Microsoft
use different computing platforms. Thus, their competitive proxim-
ity' 81 is somewhat distant. The products are not intended to be used
together, nor do they possess the same audience appeal as would be
the case if Microsoft developed an interface specifically for the Apple
brand of computers. 182 Fourth, Apple was, until quite recently, un-
prepared to bridge the gap between the product lines. IBM and Ap-
ple Computer revealed a long-term alliance in which both companies
will jointly produce a reduced instruction set computing (RISC) chip
purportedly to compete with Intel's X86 line of micro-processors.
This union will result in a computing environment which unifies the
Apple market with traditional IBM style machines. 183 However, this
information post-dates the instant litigation. Moreover, at the time
when Microsoft began production and distribution of its software, the
likelihood of Apple bridging this gap was extremely low. Fifth, there
is little evidence that actual confusion has occurred to date. Surely
Apple can locate some individuals who were actually confused by the
Windows product, but their numbers when compared to the com-
puter population at large are no doubt insignificant. The defendant's
good faith defense, Polaroids sixth factor, is largely irrelevant in the
instant action as Microsoft was quite aware of Apple's interface when
developing the "Windows" program. Furthermore, the good faith in-
quiry is arguably inappropriate to the entire realm of GUI inter-
faces.' 84 The quality of Microsoft's product, the seventh criterion,
cannot be questioned at this point. Although very early versions of
the software possessed their difficulties, these problems were not atyp-
ical of much software available in the infant industry at that time. Ad-
ditionally, Microsoft's more recent versions perform quite well and
face involves fairly standardized features which are consistently used to invoke particular
program commands.
180 Polaroid's second criterion is largely unhelpful in the determination of whether
GUIs warrant protection. Determining similarity between the interfaces largely begs the
question whether the interfaces deserve protection.
181 Competitive proximity is used here in a Polaroid sense and not as gauged by general
notions of business competition.
182 Clearly both the "PowerPC" and rumors about Apple's MS-DOS compatible inter-
face alter the landscape here, but these developments are expost this litigation and, there-
fore, are inappropriate for consideration in the instant analysis.
183 See Mark Halper, Apple Pushes Lad in PowerPC Area, COMPUTERWORLD, Nov. 7, 1994;
Rosemary Hamilton, IBM, Apple Outline RISC Chip Production Schedule, COMPuTERWORLD,
Nov. 4, 1991.
184 See supra part II.C.6.
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are largely accepted by the computing populace. Finally, the sophisti-
cation of the buyers, Polaroid's eighth criterion, is largely a question of
fact. Even assuming arguendo that this factor militates in Apple's favor,
the entire Polaroid calculus clearly weighs in Microsoft's favor. No sin-
gle factor is dispositive, and when all eight factors are considered to-
gether, the weight of the calculus clearly branches away from Apple.
Finally, the affirmative defense of de jure functionality imposes
the greatest barrier to Apple's claim of trade dress protection.
Microsoft may mimic those interface features which are necessary for
economic competition and which are essential to the utilitarian na-
ture of the product. The argument from computational efficiency carries
great weight in this regard.'8 5 Microsoft could argue that concerns of
computational resource allocation dictate much of the GUI's overall
"look and feel." Computing the value of a rectangle, for example,
requires fewer computational resources than computing an irregular
polygon or a circle. Thus, the concept of a "window" is best achieved
through rectangular geometry. Likewise, layering windows makes a
great deal of sense because "covering" one window with a foreground
window allows the computer to cease calculations required to main-
tain the "background" window. A creative individual may undoubt-
edly discover other interface features that are dictated by
computational efficiency and are thus functional.
A second functionality argument arises from the concept of
standardization. Because GUIs have become commonplace across
many computational platforms,8 6 consumers expect and demand
that new applications adhere to these standards. Since the basic no-
tion of a "windows"-style interface is dictated by utilitarian concerns,
computational efficiency concerns, and the argument from developmental
efficiency,'87 broad protection for the Apple interface contradicts the
Lanham Act's purpose and goals. In other words, Apple's case loses
force when balancing the Lanham Act's goals-proscribing unfair
competition and false designation of origin, and insuring economic
efficiency through the limitation of monopolistic impact occasioned
by the grant of trade dress protection.
In sum, Apple's contention that its interface represents a protect-
able computer GUI fails on all three elements of a Lanham Act cause
of action. The Apple GUI fails either to possess secondary meaning as
understood at common law or to be inherently distinctive, although
185 See supra note 127 and accompanying text for a discussion of the argument from
computational eicieny.
186 GUIs are present not only on Apple and MS-DOS systems, but may also be found
for the Amiga, UNIX, OS/2, and XEROX platforms, to name but a few.




the former element likely existed at some earlier point in time. Sec-
ond, even assuming that Apple meets either prong of the above test,
the likelihood of consumer confusion approaches zero. On both an
intuitive level and when considered under the rubric of the Polaroid
factors, the Microsoft GUI is likely to cause only de minimis consumer
confusion. Finally, because GUIs have become an accepted standard
in computer applications, primary elements of Apple's interface are
dejure functional and therefore fall outside the scope of Lanham Act
protection. The industry has accepted GUIs as a de facto standard
across many computational platforms and software products. The
practical upshot is that de jure functionality serves as an affirmative
defense for Microsoft and any other purported infringers who choose
to produce a GUI similar in overall concept to Apple's "window"-
based interface.
Although trade dress will serve as an important mechanism in the
protection of future unique interfaces, Mr. Bain's decision not to pur-
sue a Lanham Act cause of action in the Microsoft litigation was far
from a "goof." Mr. Bain realized that the facts underlying Apple's case
flatly did not support a trade dress claim.
E. Concluding Remarks
American economic inquiry increasingly focuses on highly tech-
nological goods and services. In our "global village," where the
microchip reigns supreme and machines both drive and are driven by
the human condition, courts must recognize the symbiotic relation-
ship existing between people and computers. This relationship re-
quires thoughtful "tweaking" to insure maximum benefit with a
corresponding minimal societal cost.
To some legal commentators, perhaps those for whom computers
are merely novel rather than necessary tools of productivity, software
interfaces seem intuitively outside the scope of federal legislative pro-
tection. Starting from this conclusion, these authors proceed to find
premises which support such a pre-determination. Such a logical fal-
lacy displays the worst excesses of legal realism. Articulating a logical
syllogism from its premises downward, on the other hand, begins with
an examination of the Lanham Act, its legislative purpose, and its his-
torical affinity with the torts of passing and palming off. This primary
inquiry deciphers the societal and legal considerations animating the
Act. The secondary inquiry examines the medium-specifically,
graphical user interfaces-and determines whether the medium's fea-
tures fall within such societal and legal considerations. This Note con-
tends that GUIs fall neatly within the language, scope and common-
law interpretation of the Lanham Act thereby meriting protection
where they meet the criteria outlined above. Finally, on a purely eco-
[Vol. 80:158
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nomic level, in those instances where protection does not create un-
healthy monopolies or impose disproportional externalities on
competing producers, society ultimately benefits when software pro-
ducers receive incentive to research, produce, and market software
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